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Australia’s universal healthcare system won’t be sustainable 
in its current form if the current rate of increasing utilisation, 
and therefore the cost to taxpayers, continues.
Spiralling healthcare costs have the potential to jeopardise our 
universal healthcare system and result in rationing of services, 
such as through longer waiting times for surgery. They will 
also be a significant burden on future generations and reduce 
government funding available for other key areas from education to infrastructure.
Meaningful reform is the only option and this policy perspective sets out key 
options for how that reform can be undertaken.
Recommendations in this report include introducing pre-funding for healthcare 
costs by quarantining three per cent of superannuation (either by increasing the 
current rate or using a portion of that already paid).
It also recommends hypothecating a portion of tax revenue directly to healthcare 
spending to improve transparency of the cost of healthcare and provide a cap 
on spending. This would mean that the community would get what it is willing to 
pay for and if additional spending was required there would be a direct link to the 
amount of tax collected and healthcare premiums paid.
It also provides recommendations for improving the pricing of generic drugs in 
Australia, potentially saving billions in healthcare spending by Government.
Finally, this policy perspective examines how to build on Australia’s comparative 
advantage in the biomedicine industry. To grow this industry it is vital that there 
is significantly stronger recognition and funding support for commercialisation of 
new drugs through the National Health and Medical Research Council primary 
research funding. 
In addition, there needs to be better engagement between science, technol-
ogy, engineering and mathematics (STEM) students with industry through, for 
example, internships and improved industry engagement with degree accredita-
tion schemes to ensure that courses reflect skill demand.
I would like to thank the CEDA Advisory Group that oversaw the development 
of this project and the six contributing authors. The calibre of these authors and 
their contributions is outstanding.
I would also like to particularly thank Australian Unity for embracing this research. 
Support such as this from our members makes it possible for CEDA to drive 
debate and discussion on significant issues such as those in this report.
Professor the Hon. Stephen Martin 
Chief Executive 
CEDA
Foreword
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Health is a foundation stone of the nation’s wellbeing and 
prosperity. Good health drives workforce participation and 
productivity, in turn delivering financial resilience and quality of 
life. It frees people up for the social and civic engagement that 
is so critical to functioning communities. And it eases pres-
sure on the healthcare system.
Australia’s health system has much to commend it – indeed 
on some measures it has been world-leading. Over the last 30 years life expec-
tancy has greatly increased and preventable deaths have reduced. But while 
more Australians are living longer, they are often living unwell. The rate of chronic 
disease is mounting, and fast. Overlay a demographic component – the ageing of 
the population as the Baby Boomer generation moves into retirement – and the 
pressure on the nation’s health system inexorably builds. 
Without significant reform in the medium term, the demand for health resources 
threatens to exceed supply, overwhelming the system, swamping state and 
federal budgets and reducing quality of life for all. 
In this context, the time is ripe for a robust national discussion on healthcare. We 
can be doing more to make our health system work smarter.  A key change, in 
my view, is to broaden the remit of healthcare from its traditional role of provid-
ing acute services to sick patients towards giving the public greater support to 
maintaining good health and managing illness effectively. In other words, patient-
centred care.
Healthcare is such an important policy arena that it demands policy makers lift 
themselves above today’s “strife of interests” and focus on reforms that will yield 
a sustainable sector, decades into the future.
CEDA’s independent research and thought-leadership can play a crucial role in 
the public policy debate on healthcare, and Australian Unity is proud to support 
this contribution.
Rohan Mead 
Group Managing Director, Australian Unity.
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Advances in medicine over the past 100 years have transformed human life 
expectancy and the management of illness. Here in Australia we enjoy one of 
the longest life expectancies in the world. This is largely due to the reasonably 
equitable and relatively efficient healthcare system the nation operates. Australia 
has also developed a comparative advantage in biotechnology that has resulted 
in it becoming one of the nation’s largest export earning sectors. 
However, Australia’s healthcare funding arrangements can at best be described 
as suboptimal and current policy settings involve a level of rationing of access to 
medical service, typically through waiting lists for elective surgery or restricting 
access to medical treatments. 
As medical technology advances, it becomes more desirable to intervene earlier 
and more intensively than in the past. This increases the level of utilisation of 
healthcare services at all ages. It is this increasing utilisation of medical services 
that will have a larger influence over the financial sustainability of the healthcare 
sector than the ageing of the population.  
The combined impact of greater utilisation and an ageing and growing population 
means that the system must adapt and for that to happen, we need health reform 
that ensures every dollar spent will buy more and better quality health services.
In light of these escalating health pressures, it will be important to ensure that 
the health system provides value for money. This requires a health system that 
responds well to innovation, funding cost-effective improvements to healthcare 
while being able to adjust spending levels in areas where better value for money 
could be obtained. 
Executive  
summary
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Recommendations 
The recommendations in this policy perspective represent a significant change to 
the way healthcare is funded. However, the reforms are necessary if Australia is to 
maintain universal access to the best possible healthcare in the future. 
This policy perspective also puts forward important recommendations so that 
Australia can continue to take advantage of its comparative advantage in biotech-
nology and sustain it in the future.
Reforming the healthcare sector
To introduce dynamic efficiency into the healthcare sector and to reduce the level 
of intergenerational equity transfer, major reforms are needed to the way health-
care costs are funded and services delivered. Improvements to incentives could 
be achieved by: 
Aggregating all health funding at the level of the individual; •	
Having financial risk reside with competing health funds through insurance •	
arrangements, introducing managed competition, eliminating fragmented 
responsibility and cost shifting; 
Linking public healthcare budgets and community expectations of healthcare •	
services to economic capacity to pay, via a fully hypothecated Medicare levy 
that funds healthcare expenditure; and
Introducing pre-funding for healthcare costs by quarantining a portion of the •	
Superannuation Guarantee rate, or increasing the Levy, so that approximately 
three per cent is set aside to cover healthcare costs.
Improving the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme pricing
Australia is currently paying substantially more for key generic drugs than com-
parable countries. These high costs account for a substantial portion of the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme’s (PBS) financial impost. To improve the pricing 
of generic drugs the PBS should: 
Adopt a public consultation process in setting the next pricing agreement, due •	
next year, that engages all stakeholders and not just those with a vested finan-
cial interest; and 
Explicitly attempt to capitalise on the expiry of pharmaceutical patents by adopt-•	
ing price cuts that reflect the price of manufacturing generic drugs. A tendering 
system similar to New Zealand or the Netherlands should be considered.  
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Enhancing our comparative advantage: Translating ideas into 
action
To improve the research culture and to allow greater interaction between aca-
demia and industry: 
The National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) research funding •	
criteria should be changed to acknowledge work on commercialisation. 
To help develop commercialisation critical mass in our universities and research 
centres: 
The small and disaggregated commercialisation units should be integrated to •	
achieve greater levels of commercialisation expertise.  
To help traverse the innovation “valley of death” in biotechnology: 
A portion of the $780 million a year allocated through the NHMRC for primary •	
research should explicitly support translation efforts. These funds should be 
allocated via a passive ownership model, such as a program that converts to 
equity if successful or to a grant if not.
To encourage greater mobility between academia and industry, and to improve 
the work ready skills of science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) 
students, the Government should: 
Ensure that students starting STEM are engaged in collaborative efforts with •	
industry, for example internships. The Australian CRC program could act as an 
environment to foster industry-relevant skills; and
Industry should be engaged with degree accreditation schemes to ensure that •	
the curricula reflects skill demands.  
Contributions and acknowledgements
This report includes a series of contributions from a range of experts providing sig-
nificant reform recommendations for the healthcare sector and on how Australia 
can capitalise on biotechnology developments to enhance our knowledge inten-
sive and high value export sector. 
In Sustaining universal healthcare in Australia: Introducing dynamic efficiency, 
Professor Johannes (Just) Stoelwinder describes how the financial unsustainabil-
ity of Australia’s healthcare system is a consequence of the growing utilisation of 
medical services, not just the ageing of the population. He argues that politicians 
are not well positioned to manage community expectations and achieve effi-
ciency improvements on an ongoing basis. To address these problems, Professor 
Stoelwinder recommends a model that puts the patient at the centre of health-
care funding arrangements and creates incentives that can promote efficiency 
improvements. 
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In Healthcare reform in an ageing Australia, Dr Vince FitzGerald elaborates on the 
patient centred funding model, highlighting the importance of healthcare security 
in retirement and how healthcare costs are concentrated in old age. He describes 
how the reforms recommended by Professor Stoelwinder could be funded more 
equitably, between generations, and more sustainably, with a component of 
pre-funding (funds contributed and accumulating before retirement). This would 
reduce the burden on future taxpayers. This could be administered using the 
existing superannuation system. Dr FitzGerald notes that the proposals would 
create stronger incentives for innovation and productivity improvement and better 
balance the benefits and costs of healthcare choices. 
In The price is wrong: Pharmaceutical expenditure in Australia over the last 
decade and options for reform, Professor Philip Clarke details how Australia has 
failed to capitalise on the expiry of many pharmaceutical patents. As a conse-
quence, a substantial portion of the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) is 
spent paying internationally high prices for generic drugs. Professor Clarke details 
how comparable countries have reduced the costs of generic drugs significantly. 
In Ensuring Australia’s comparative advantage in biotechnology, Dr Anna Lavelle 
describes how Australia’s world class science and medical research, strong 
capacity for international partnerships, cost effectiveness and transparent and 
effective regulatory system, have contributed to the nation’s comparative advan-
tage in biotechnology. Dr Lavelle also outlines a series of actions that could 
enhance this comparative advantage. 
The technological developments that are facilitating medical advances are also 
making it more challenging to take a potential drug from concept to commercial 
reality. In Traversing the valley of death, Dr Julian Clark elaborates on these tech-
nical difficulties, and the institutional and cultural challenges that make Australia’s 
translation record particularly poor when compared internationally. Dr Clark also 
makes recommendations to facilitate more translation research. 
In Why STEM skills are important for innovation, Professor Ian Chubb describes 
the trends in science, technology, engineering and mathematics education. 
Professor Chubb also outlines the challenges Australia will face in sustaining 
a competitive advantage in innovative industries based on current education 
trends. 
CEDA wishes to acknowledge the input and expert advice from the Advisory 
Group in the development of this policy perspective. The CEDA Advisory Group 
consisted of:
Professor David Penington AC, Professor Emeritus, Melbourne University; •	
Chairman of Bionic Vision Australia; and former Chairman, Bio21 Australia; 
Dr Meera Verma, Proprietor at Headland Vision; and Non-Executive Director at •	
Biosenssis and AusBiotech; and 
Ian Ferres, Chairman of the Australian Healthcare Investment Company; Director •	
of Australian Unity; and a Consultant for Tresscox Lawyers. 
These healthcare experts provided guidance at the start of the project and input 
on the final recommendations. However, the final report is entirely the responsibil-
ity of the individual authors.
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CEDA  
overview:  
Reform or ration
Nathan Taylor
CEDA Chief Economist
Australia’s healthcare funding arrangements can at best be described as 
suboptimal. Universal healthcare access is funded by a number of sources, 
Commonwealth, state governments, and private contributions, and is focused on 
processes and institutions rather than patient outcomes. Not only is there a lack 
of clarity about financial responsibility for services, which encourages elaborate 
cost shifting behaviour between the tiers of government and service providers, 
the incentives of the funding arrangements are flawed. The result is poorer, and 
relatively more expensive, outcomes for patients and few incentives to achieve 
ongoing innovation in the healthcare sector. 
Australia’s Medical Benefits Schedule (MBS) and Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme 
(PBS) are open ended commitments trying to achieve an appropriate trade-off 
between cost and benefits for services. The MBS pays doctors for medical ser-
vices on the basis of open-ended, fee for service arrangements. This approach 
has many benefits, such as responsiveness to patient needs. However, a major 
disadvantage is that it is very difficult to manage expenditure and has been 
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described as “a blank cheque to providers, who can induce demand for their own 
services if they so wish”.1 This publication outlines how successive governments 
have failed to capitalise on potential cost savings in the PBS.2 
Medical advances have the potential to drive efficiencies but only with the 
right incentive structures to encourage best clinical practice. Currently there is 
a tendency for medical advances to be additive rather than replacing obsolete 
practices. Coronary artery angioplasty represents a good example. This medical 
intervention is a much less invasive and less costly alternative to coronary artery 
bypass grafting (CABG). However, over the first years of its introduction the 
number of CABG procedures did not change, while angioplasties were able to 
be used in older patients who were not eligible for the CABG.3 The result was an 
overall increase in healthcare expenditure and the continuation of a less efficient 
treatment. The model proposed in this publication would create incentives for the 
most efficacious treatment to be used. 
The overall level of waste and adverse events has been estimated at between 20 
and 30 per cent of healthcare expenditure in the United States.4 While the figure 
is likely to be equivalently significant in Australia, the Strategic Review of Health 
and Medical Research in Australia (the McKeon Review) consultation paper states 
that the exact amount is not currently known. The McKeon Review recommended 
establishing integrated health research centres to facilitate best-practice transla-
tion of research directly into healthcare delivery improvements.5 
It is important to create a stronger link between a patient’s use of medical ser-
vices and the benefits they receive from them. The funding model used to 
support healthcare needs to be individual focused rather than institution or 
process focused. This is particularly important given how the increasing level of 
Figure 1 
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Source: AIHW, Health system expenditure 2004-05 and Intergenerational Report 2012
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use of medical services will undermine the financial sustainability of the healthcare 
system. A business as usual projection of healthcare expenditure to 2050-51 
shows that the costs associated with the ageing of the population are dwarfed by 
those associated with increasing use of healthcare services (See Figure 1).6 
Politicians are not well positioned to link community expectations for access to 
healthcare services with the associated financial costs, or to introduce administra-
tive reforms.7 There is a need to address the institutional arrangements and place 
the patient’s interests at the centre of the healthcare system. The proposal set 
out in this publication may not resolve all financial problems with the healthcare 
system but it would add a level of accountability and efficiency incentives that do 
not currently exist. Continuing with the existing system of allocating healthcare 
resources will result in greater levels of rationing of access to healthcare services 
in the future than occur now.
Issues posed by the funding of future health costs are similar to those for the 
funding future retirement income.8 The beneficiaries of future healthcare spending 
will be disproportionately the older groups in the population, comprising a larger 
proportion of the population in the future than they do now. These individuals are 
generally in the working population at this point in time. Introducing an element of 
pre-funding for future health costs will both be more sustainable and efficient and 
be more equitable between successive generations.
To introduce dynamic efficiency into the healthcare sector and to reduce the level 
of intergenerational equity transfer, major reforms are needed to the way health-
care costs are funded and services delivered. Improvements to incentives could 
be achieved by: 
Aggregating all health funding at the level of the individual; •	
Having financial risk reside with competing health funds through insurance •	
arrangements, introducing managed competition, eliminating fragmented 
responsibility and cost shifting; 
Linking public healthcare budgets and community expectations of healthcare •	
services to economic capacity to pay, via a fully hypothecated Medicare Levy 
that funds healthcare expenditure; and
Introducing pre-funding for healthcare costs by quarantining a portion of the •	
Superannuation Guarantee rate, or increasing the Levy, so that approximately 
three per cent is set aside to cover healthcare costs.
Pricing generic drugs
The current price adjustment mechanism for drugs exiting patent protection is 
very weak in Australia. The eight generic drugs that receive the largest subsidies 
from the PBS were between two to almost 30 times higher in Australia relative 
to comparable healthcare regimes.9 If Australia had paid prices for these generic 
drugs equivalent to the UK then the financial savings would be more than a billion 
dollars. Australia should seek to have generic drugs priced closer to their marginal 
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cost of production. Not only would this reduce the financial impost of the PBS, but 
it could improve the health of the population as the prescription of many generic 
medications could be expanded.10 
The memorandum of understanding (MOU) that sets the price for generic drugs 
is set to expire in July 2014. This represents an opportunity to more appropriately 
priced generic drugs. Yet the Government has only indicated that it would set 
a new price agreement with representatives from the Pharmaceutical Industry 
and the Consumers Health Forum, the same bodies that established the current 
MOU. 
Since the mid-2000s a large number of widely used pharmaceuticals have expired 
and many more are set to expire. Governments in other countries have taken 
advantage of this to significantly lower the prices of generic drugs which consti-
tute a large portion of the financial impost of the PBS. To improve the pricing of 
generic drugs in the PBS, Australia should: 
Adopt a public consultation process in setting the next pricing agreement, one •	
that engages all stakeholders and not just those with a vested financial interest; 
and 
Explicitly attempt to capitalise on the expiry of pharmaceutical patents by adopt-•	
ing price cuts that reflect the price of manufacturing generic drugs. A tendering 
system similar to New Zealand or the Netherlands should be considered. 
These reforms would enhance the financial and potentially the physical health of 
all Australians, but particularly those with chronic illnesses. 
Economic opportunities in medical advances
There have been many promising breakthroughs that have occurred in bio-
medicine in recent years. Coupled with increasing demand from an ageing world 
growing in wealth, there is a substantial global market for medical advances. 
Australia has managed to leverage its educated workforce and strong institutions 
to create a commercial comparative advantage in biotechnology. As a con-
sequence, Australia has a biotechnology sector that is capitalised at twice the 
OECD average as a portion of the stock market. While growing rapidly, the sector 
also represents one of the largest high value adding export earning industries for 
the country. 
Australia’s success in the biotechnology industry is indicative of the role the nation 
can play in high skilled, high value adding industries that are global in nature. As 
a consequence, the policy framework that underpins the continued development 
of biomedicine is important for all innovative industries. Australia needs to be 
able to effectively encourage innovation if it seeks to enjoy continued advances 
in national prosperity when the terms of trade normalise and commodities do not 
buttress national income growth.
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Translating ideas into action
Australia has consistently developed a disproportionate amount of the world’s 
medical advances, producing three per cent of the world’s patents while having 
only one per cent of the global population. Australia’s biotechnology industry has 
seized on the opportunities presented by medical advances to transform itself 
from a domestically focused sector into one intimately linked with global inno-
vation. As a consequence, medicinal and pharmaceutical exports have risen 
from $455 million in 1991–92 to over four billion in 2011–12.11 Biotechnology 
represents one of the most successful, high-skilled export earning industries in 
Australia, significantly outstripping exports from the automobile sector. 
Australia’s biotechnology industry successfully built on the nation’s strong primary 
research coupled with robust international connections. The economic growth 
of India and China, among other developing countries, has opened up substan-
tial export opportunities for Australia, with exports to China representing over 
10 per cent of total exports during the financial year 2010–11.12 As the level of 
income rises in developing economies, the demand for medical products will only 
increase. 
Despite the positive environment for biotechnology, the global industry faces 
increasing challenges in commercialising research due to the increasing risk and 
complexity involved in the process. Breakthroughs such as molecular biomarkers 
for certain diseases generate many new potential therapies to be investigated, 
each of which requires large amounts of research at a cost of hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars and with a substantial probability of failure. Despite a near doubling 
Figure 2 
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of aggregate research and development budgets in the pharmaceutical industry, 
from $68 billion in 2002 to $127 billion in 2010, there has not been a marked 
increase in the number of new drugs approved.13 Past commercialisation success 
does not guarantee continued growth in Australia’s biotechnology sector. 
Australia has a poor track record of turning primary research into commercial 
reality. Australia ranks highly in terms of global innovation input, but rates 107th 
out of 141 countries assessed in terms of innovation efficiency.14 A key reason 
for this research inefficiency is an academic culture that is seemingly divorced 
from the commercialisation process. The important National Health and Medical 
Research Council (NHMRC) project grants and fellowships are provided for health 
and medical research but not medical commercialisation. The metrics to measure 
applicants focus on academic criteria. Time spent in the translation process 
results in fewer academic publications and so reduces the likelihood of a suc-
cessful funding application. The current NHMRC criteria indirectly punish those 
who spend time on commercialisation activity. 
Poor academic incentives in Australia may help explain why Sweden and 
Switzerland have a patenting rate between four and five times higher, along with 
a long history of academic engagement in transferring technological innovations 
into commercial products. To improve the research culture and to allow greater 
interaction between academia and industry: 
Rather than indirectly penalising translation efforts, the NHMRC research funding •	
criteria should be changed to acknowledge work on commercialisation activity. 
The growing complexity of biomedicine requires more highly skilled practitioners 
throughout the translation chain, including all aspects of commercialisation. Most 
universities and research institutes have commercialisation units associated with 
them but they often lack the expertise to successfully navigate the increasingly 
complex translation process. 
The situation can radically change when critical mass is achieved, as demon-
strated by UniQuest, the commercialisation arm of the University of Queensland.15 
UniQuest has generated over $320 million in revenue from initial funding of $10 
million.16 To help develop commercialisation critical mass in our universities and 
research centres: 
The small and disaggregated commercialisation units should be integrated to •	
achieve greater levels of commercialisation resources and expertise. 
The growing complexity of the process involved in translating an idea into a 
commercial product has put significant strains on traditional sources of funding 
of pharmaceutical research and development. This is particularly pronounced in 
Australia which lacks the economies of scale associated with highly successful 
venture capital areas. The level of risk involved in the translation process dimin-
ishes dramatically as the concept moves through the three “valleys of death.”17 
While research and experimentation received more than $8 billion in annual 
support, only approximately 1.5 per cent is spent on commercialisation, and half 
of these funds were directed towards the automotive sector.18 
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To help traverse the innovation “valley of death” in biomedicine: 
A portion of the $780 million a year allocated through the NHMRC for primary •	
research should explicitly support translation efforts. These funds should be 
allocated via a passive ownership model, such as a program that converts to 
equity if successful or to a grant if not.
Maintaining comparative advantage
While Australia has contributed a disproportionate amount to global knowledge in 
healthcare, this has been assisted by it being an advanced economy and having a 
highly educated workforce. As the productivity differential between workers in the 
OECD and the rest of the world diminishes, Australia’s comparative advantage in 
healthcare could prove transitory rather than a source of sustained competitive 
advantage. This is a challenge for all innovative sectors operating in Australia. 
In common with many developed economies, the historical comparative advan-
tage that Australia has enjoyed because of its highly educated workforce is 
diminishing. This is partially due to the quality of the developing world’s educa-
tional systems having improved. It is also due to a declining number of Australian 
students undertaking the science, technology, engineering and mathematics 
(STEM) studies that underpin an innovative economy. 
In contrast, many developing countries have started from a low educational base 
but have been investing heavily in improving the productivity of their workforces. 
For instance, when South Korea developed its modern educational system: 
“ The very vocabulary to talk about modern science and mathematics hardly existed 
in the Korean language and had to be invented before textbooks could even be 
written.” 19 
Concerted efforts to improve scientific and technical education underpinned 
South Korea’s emergence into a modern developed economy. A similar transfor-
mation is underway in China and India. In 2002, the total number of STEM field20 
first university degrees awarded in Asia was just over one million, with almost half 
a million in China alone and a further 176,036 in India. By 2010 the total STEM 
degrees awarded in China had risen to 2.6 million, with the figure anticipated to 
rise to 3.5 million by 2015.21 China alone will produce more STEM degrees in 
2015 than all of Asia did as first degrees in 2002. India is experiencing similar 
growth trajectories. 
While Australia’s advantage of having a relatively highly educated workforce is 
eroding, the nation is still placed above average in the Program for International 
Student Assessment (PISA) results. However, this relative success is rapidly 
declining as illustrated in the table below. 
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Countries outperforming Australia in PISA testing
2000 2003 2006 2009
Korea Finland Finland Shanghai-China
Japan Japan HK Finland
Korea Canada Hong Kong – China
Singapore
Japan
Korea
Australia Australia Australia Australia 
Not only does the relative decline in student performance need to be addressed, 
but a concerted effort needs to be made to improve the quality and quantity of all 
STEM students. In the US it has been recognised that there needs to be a shift 
away from: 
“ University degree programs aimed almost exclusively at preparing people for aca-
demic research positions to include diverse training in entrepreneurship, project 
management, and research translation.” 22 
To encourage greater mobility between academia and industry, and to improve 
the work ready skills of STEM students, the Government should: 
Ensure that students starting STEM are engaged in collaborative efforts with •	
industry, for instance internships. The Australian CRC program could act as an 
environment to foster industry-relevant skills; and
Have industry engaged with degree accreditation schemes to ensure that the •	
curricula reflects skill demands. 
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This chapter examines why the present healthcare 
system is unsustainable and in need of further reform 
and options for addressing the root causes of its 
unsustainability.
1.  Sustaining universal healthcare  
in Australia: Introducing  
dynamic efficiency
 Professor Johannes Stoelwinder
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Introduction
Despite five years of reform effort, Australia’s universal healthcare system remains 
unsustainable in the long term. It is not population nor demographic changes that 
are the main drivers of healthcare’s inexorable cost increases, but the vulnerability 
to pressure from vested interest groups on the political process of allocation of 
resources in a tax funded system. 
Maintaining universal access to a tax-based system is appropriate as it provides 
an equitable cross-subsidy to support those in the community with high cost 
healthcare needs. However, a superior model of funding is needed that links 
total expenditure to the capacity of the economy to pay; that makes the cost of 
providing universal healthcare transparent to all; that accommodates choice and 
competition at the level of the healthcare plan to create the conditions for what 
economists refer to as dynamic efficiency.
Australia has the building blocks necessary and the Netherlands reforms of 2006 
provide guidelines to design a system that meets these conditions. This paper 
aims to demonstrate the need and explores how such a fundamental reform 
could be designed.
Background
After five years of effort to reform Australia’s healthcare system what have we 
achieved? The main structural characteristics of financing and stewardship 
remain largely unchanged, with dysfunctional fragmentation between the 
Commonwealth, state governments and private insurers. The main constraint 
seems to be that imposed by the nature of the Australian federation. This has 
allowed state governments and their health bureaucrats to blunt the main reform 
effort by the Commonwealth to progressively take-over responsibility for public 
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hospitals so as to create a single health system, having instead to settle for linking 
marginal increased contribution for hospital funding to the states to devolution of 
hospital funding and governance, centralised “efficient” pricing and greater clarity 
and transparency in performance measurement and accountability – reforms that 
were already at play. The “blame game” remains alive and well.1 
In the areas in which the Commonwealth has a free hand, such as primary care, 
reform has centred on the implementation of Medicare Locals as geographic 
coordinators of primary care. These will likely develop as conduits for funding 
specific initiatives, such as after-hours access, but they have not been given the 
levers to influence the dominant component, that of General Practice. Whatever 
its potential, this reform is vulnerable if there is a change in government at the 
next election, as the Opposition has pledged to abolish them.2 The Government’s 
reform commitment to prevention, through the Australian Preventive Health 
Agency, has already suffered a significant budget cut.2 While the eHealth strategy 
of developing the personally controlled electronic health record (PCEHR) met its 
scheduled implementation date of July 2012, enrolment to date has been limited, 
although it is too early to judge its success.4 
On the one hand we should not be too disappointed with the reform outcome, 
for as the Canadian political scientist Carolyn Hughes Tuohy long ago warned 
us: “Major policy initiatives altering the fundamental institutional mix and structural 
balance in healthcare….are episodic and rare. (They) have required an extraor-
dinary mobilisation of political authority and will and…have depended on factors 
largely external to (health).”5 
On the other hand we continue to face serious long term challenges to the sus-
tainability of one of our important policy achievements – universal healthcare in 
the form of Medicare.
Is Medicare sustainable?
The Commonwealth Treasury Intergenerational Reports give the clearest indica-
tion of the challenge of sustainability of Medicare. The Commonwealth contributes 
around 50 per cent of total funding for healthcare through the Medical Benefits 
Scheme, the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme and its contribution to the states 
for public hospitals. Already in its 2002–03 Intergenerational Report Treasury 
forecast, the Commonwealth’s contribution to healthcare would increase from 
the then four per cent of GDP to eight per cent of GDP by 2041–42.6 It further 
noted that real growth in spending was mainly driven by increased utilisation of 
services (i.e. non-demographic growth) at 3.2 per cent per annum since 1989–
90, compared to that due to population growth at 1.2 per cent per annum, and 
ageing of the population contributing 0.5 per cent growth per annum. The 2010 
Intergenerational Report updates the forecast suggesting that Commonwealth 
spending on health will increase to a lower 7.1 per cent of GDP by 2050 with 
ageing and population growth continuing to contribute around 40 per cent and 
increased utilisation of services accounting for 60 per cent.7 As for the states, 
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their financial vulnerability to escalating healthcare spending and, in particular, 
spending on public hospitals is even greater, with health expenditure being the 
largest component of their budget, typically around 27 per cent. 
These facts highlight two key challenges to financial sustainability. The first is the 
capacity and desire of the Commonwealth and state governments to continue to 
fund this level of growth in spending. Economic circumstances and political priori-
ties will influence their response, but the states in particular will remain constrained 
by their limited capacity to raise revenue. For the Commonwealth this ongoing 
trend in health spending will be the major contributor to the forecast escalation 
of its fiscal gap, commencing at around 2030. The second is that increased 
utilisation (more services per person per year) is the main driver of this increase in 
cost, not the commonly held concerns about ageing of the population. Utilisation 
growth is important as policy decisions and management can influence it, but 
there is little that can be done to alter demographic changes. 
It is clear from the above that Australia’s capacity 
to sustain a universal health scheme will depend 
on a political willingness to continue to fund the 
predicted growth in health spending by either 
re-allocation within the budget, increased taxes 
and/or greater co-payments. Alternatively, or in 
addition, the growth in cost needs scaling back 
by restraining utilisation and improving health-
care productivity. Improving labour productivity 
will be important because of the labour intensity 
of healthcare, but it has actually been declin-
ing. In the United States over the period 1990 to 2010 the healthcare and social 
assistance industry sector experienced employment growth of 2.9 per cent (com-
pound annual growth rate), but labor productivity growth was minus 0.6 per cent 
(compared to positive 1.7 per cent for the overall US economy).8 Similar concerns 
have been expressed about poor labour productivity in Australian healthcare.9 
Given we have a predominantly government controlled, tax-funded healthcare 
system the allocation of governments’ budgets, changes to healthcare utilisa-
tion and improving healthcare labour productivity all become political exercises, 
pitting political decision makers against the power of health professions, health 
organisations and other vested interests. In a tax-funded model providers have 
no option but to engage in the politics of the budget allocation process. Their 
revenue/income results not from the accumulation of decisions made by consum-
ers exercising choice, but the result of their success in political lobbying during 
the budget process. 
Tax funding sets up moral hazard – neither the consumer nor their agent, typically 
their doctor, wears significant financial cost as a consequence of the decisions 
they make to consume healthcare resources, therefore encouraging consump-
tion, even if only potentially beneficial. This is further complicated by the incentives 
of a predominantly fee-for-service payment arrangement for doctors and other 
health practitioners. Together these features facilitate the observed increase in 
healthcare utilisation. 
“ Tax funding sets up moral hazard – neither the 
consumer nor their agent, typically their doctor, 
wears significant financial cost as a consequence 
of the decisions they make to consume 
healthcare resources, therefore encouraging 
consumption, even if only potentially beneficial.”
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The prospect of governments managing the politics involved in controlling the 
growth of utilisation in these circumstances seem problematic and have rarely 
been successfully achieved. Finally, government-controlled health professional 
regulation maintains occupational silos in healthcare delivery. This protects health 
professionals from competition and is actively resisted when challenged, for 
example the introduction of independent nurse practitioners in primary care or the 
tension between obstetricians and independent midwives. Improving health work-
force productivity will surely require a more flexible and coordinated workforce. 
The difficulty politicians face in seeking to respond to these challenges was best 
articulated in a speech by the then Dutch Health Minister, Hans Hoogervorst, in 
explaining the Dutch 2006 health reforms. He identified three crucial problems:
“Firstly, there is the sharp rise in costs caused by technological advances and 
ageing…
Secondly, most Dutch citizens – like their counterparts in most other European coun-
tries – have grown up with the idea that healthcare is free…
Thirdly, we need to change because when it comes to controlling costs, the govern-
ment always stands alone. The result was increasingly spasmodic efforts to keep a 
grip on prices. True, you can hold down costs by having maximum prices, fixed tariffs 
and budgetary ceilings. But it also obstructs any kind of creativity. The government is 
always the bad guy, while the established powers in the healthcare sector – and they 
are very strong ones – make every change difficult.” 10 
This analysis begs the question – can we mitigate the influence of health politics 
on the reform of the health system? The Dutch have sought to do so in their 
2006 reforms.11 While it is not possible to transpose one country’s health system 
onto another because of the different paths they have travelled in their history, it 
is possible to distil the design features of one and test how they could be applied 
in another. In the following section the key features of the Dutch reform as they 
could apply to supporting sustainability of Medicare in Australia are explored. This 
is not to argue that the Dutch reforms have yet achieved a sustainable healthcare 
system, but that its design features provide insights into an alternative design 
that may address the key incentive issues that will make Australia’s system 
sustainable.12 
Funding a universal health scheme
A universal health scheme requires mandatory participation in which access to 
benefits is not constrained by an individual’s capacity to pay. Therefore, some 
form of cross-subsidy has to be constructed in funding care. Most commonly 
this is done through taxation by which richer members of the community cross-
subsidise poorer. This may be via general taxation (e.g. Australia and Canada) or 
a hypothecated tax (usually payroll e.g. Medicare for those aged over 65 in the 
USA, or part of the new Dutch scheme). An alternative is from compulsory insur-
ance (usually referred to as social insurance), used in Western European countries 
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with “Bismarckian” systems (e.g. Germany and Switzerland). An alternative form 
of cross-subsidy is that based on risk – in which participants with lower than 
average risk cross-subsidise those of higher risk. This is mostly used in voluntary 
health insurance where solidarity is achieved through regulated community-rating 
(i.e. the premium cost of a health policy is not rated according to the individual’s 
risk but the pooled risk of those with that policy). This model is used, for example, 
in voluntary health insurance in Australia and South Africa.
Deciding how much to spend on 
healthcare in the case of tax funding 
from general revenue is a political 
process involving both decisions about 
budget allocation and the scope of the 
benefit package to be covered. As 
argued above, these are subject to the 
influence of vested interests that politi-
cians seem to struggle to withstand. 
Other than the general resistance to 
increased taxes and the pressure from competing budget recipients, politicians 
have little support in controlling spending on healthcare. The Dutch have sought 
to deal with this by explicitly linking, through their insurance law, 50 per cent of the 
total spending on health to the funds raised by a hypothecated payroll tax13 – thus 
creating a spending cap linked to economic growth. More can be spent on health 
but this would need an explicit political decision to raise the level of the payroll 
tax. Australia could introduce similar dynamics by hypothecating the Medicare 
levy and restricting it as the full funding source for Medicare. The current Medicare 
levy of 1.5 per cent, which is not hypothecated, raises less than 20 per cent of 
the Commonwealth’s contribution to spending on health. Based on the National 
Health and Hospitals Reform Commission’s estimate a hypothecated Medicare 
levy required to fully fund Medicare would have to be increased to around 14 per 
cent of personal income tax.14 A concomitant reduction in personal income tax 
would then be neutral in terms of total personal tax paid and total tax received 
by the Government, but would place an automatic cap on healthcare spending 
linked to the economy. 
In the Netherlands the Government pays for children up to the age of 18 from 
general taxation and this accounts for approximately five per cent of the funding 
pool. The remaining 45 per cent of the pool is raised by community-rated premium 
payments by individual adults to competing insurance funds for the basic benefit 
package – the nominal premium. (The basic package provides for services equiv-
alent to those covered by Medicare in Australia). A typical premium in 2012 is 
around €1250 per year per adult. This level of payment is designed to provide an 
incentive to all consumers to shop between product features and funds. It makes 
the cost of healthcare more directly transparent to the community. To make this 
payment equitable the Government provides an income related subsidy sourced 
from general taxation; a healthcare allowance (zorgtoeslag) of up to €750 – paid 
through the tax system. Such a funding arrangement could be implemented in 
Australia, but consideration would need to be given as to whether the gains in 
transparency, consumer engagement and the potential political counter-balance 
would warrant the extra complexity.
“ The Dutch have sought to deal with this by explicitly linking, 
through their insurance law, 50 per cent of the total spending 
on health to the funds raised by a hypothecated payroll tax 
– thus creating a spending cap linked to economic growth. 
More can be spent on health but this would need an explicit 
political decision to raise the level of the payroll tax.”
H e a l t H c a r e :  r e f o r m  o r  r a t i o n
24
H e a l t H c a r e :  r e f o r m  o r  r a t i o n
25
Moral hazard will remain a feature in any tax funded or insurance model. 
Co-payments are used in most systems to mitigate against it, but because of 
their regressive nature and impact on the sickest, there is usually a safety net, 
such as the Medicare Safety Net, or a limit to co-payments. In the Netherlands 
a compulsory maximal deductible for some services of the first €220 is applied 
(increasing to €350 in 2013) together with an additional voluntary deductible of up 
to €500, which can be chosen in return for a discount of around €250 per annum 
on the premium.15,16
Defining the benefit package in a universal system will always remain a political 
decision, but at least the above arrangements would provide a different dynamic 
to the politics of funding healthcare in Australia, with a more explicit engagement 
of the community in deciding on the growth of healthcare spending. Enhancing 
the package would require a linked and transparent increase in funding through 
both the level of the hypothecated tax and the nominal premium paid by individu-
als. The community’s desire for access to new and expensive treatments would 
then need to be matched with its willingness to pay for it.
Using choice and competition to drive innovation
The Dutch reform of competing health funds with associated consumer choice, 
is designed to drive innovation and efficiency and is modeled on the concept 
promoted by the American health economist, Alain Enthoven.17 Such “managed 
competition” has also been canvassed from time to time in Australia.18 It also 
underpinned the longer term reform proposed by the National Health and 
Hospitals Reform Commission under the title of Medicare Select.19 
The Dutch were able to implement a competitive health fund model because they 
already had in their former Bismarckian health insurance model an independent 
“meso-level” layer of (traditionally non-for-profit) health funds with the role of fund 
poolers and service payers, operating between the funder and providers.20 The 
presence of competing private health insurance funds in Australia also provides 
the structural basis for a managed competition model. This is not to say new 
entrants, such as significant provider organisations, could not join the market by 
vertically integrating into the insurance space.
Competition between health funds, based on a mandated basic benefits package 
(e.g. current Medicare benefits), is intended to drive innovation in insurance 
product design, in purchasing strategies with providers and in the coordination 
of comprehensive care of those members with chronic diseases. Funds can 
compete on price and or the quality and quantity of the benefits provided beyond 
the basic package. By aggregating all health funding for an individual (public 
and private) the health fund is the single point at financial risk for the cost of a 
member’s healthcare, noting that benefit outlays represent some 90 per cent of 
the expenses of a health fund. The fund therefore has the incentive to become 
an active purchaser of care for its members (not just to be a passive payer), to 
negotiate prices and payment models for health services providers. It has the 
H e a l t H c a r e :  r e f o r m  o r  r a t i o n
26
H e a l t H c a r e :  r e f o r m  o r  r a t i o n
27
incentive to ensure the coordination of care and innovate in care delivery models 
for those with chronic diseases, so that costs are reduced over multiple years, 
rather than simply to seek to cost shift to another payer, as happens extensively 
in the current Australian fragmented funding system. The drive to reduce provider 
costs, for example through preferred provider contracts, will be counter-balanced 
by the extent to which members will want to pay for an insurance product with 
greater provider choice. Consumer choice around the trade-off between premium 
costs, deductibles, additional benefits and provider restrictions can be expected 
to vary in the community. A managed 
competition model allows this varia-
tion in consumer preferences to play 
out in the market place, all the time 
preserving the basic benefit package. 
The alternative is a one-size-fits-all 
solution imposed by government from 
above with all the political ramifications 
discussed earlier.
Competition for consumers is played out at the level of the fund. Consumers are 
not required to engage in the market place at the time of needing healthcare ser-
vices. They have choice of fund and choice of insurance product features, which, 
in the case of the Dutch system, is exercised, during one time window each 
year. This enables the calculation of the risk equalisation scheme, which will be 
explained in the next section. Consumers need reliable information to compare 
prices and insurance options when they are exercising this choice. The Dutch 
government assists them with this with a comparator website – http://www.
kiesbeter.nl/algemeen (translation: choose better). Apart from comparative infor-
mation on health insurance this portal also provides a provider location finder and 
specific information on quality (even a black list), waiting times and general health 
information. As with many such sites much information on quality metrics is still in 
development.
Controlling inappropriate competition
Competing health funds placed at increased financial exposure to the health-
care costs of their members, required by regulation to provide community 
rated policies, have a significant incentive to compete with each other through 
risk selection, or “cherry-picking” the lowest risk consumers. With a lower than 
average risk pool for an equivalent policy an insurer can offer a lower premium 
and thus attract more lower cost entrants to the market or those interested in 
switching. As a result other funds are left with a progressively higher than average 
risk pool and then have to increase premiums further, resulting in a so-called 
death spiral. This is exacerbated if insurers can, as in Australia, incorporate 
benefit exclusions in their policies. For example, a policy that excludes cardiac 
procedures is likely to attract low claiming younger members who will not see the 
need for such procedures. As a result the community rated premium for such a 
“ A managed competition model allows this variation in 
consumer preferences to play out in the market place, all the 
time preserving the basic benefit package. The alternative 
is a one-size-fits-all solution imposed by government from 
above with all the political ramifications discussed earlier.”
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policy will be comparatively low. However, the exclusion will not be attractive to 
an older member as they are likely to need such coverage. They will stay or enrol 
in a policy with broader benefits, which will then have an increasing risk pool and 
increasing premiums. There are, of course, many other ways funds can risk select 
including advertising strategies, only being accessible via the Internet, closed 
funds being available only to employees in certain companies or industries, and 
linking risk-rated ancillary or life insurance to community rated health insurance 
being just some of the creative approaches available.
The Dutch deal with this inappropriate competition in part by defining a standard 
benefit package that all insurers must cover – that is no exclusions – but most 
importantly by a sophisticated risk equalisation scheme.
Risk equalisation
Risk equalisation involves the transfer of funds from insurers with lower than 
average risk pools to funds with higher than average pools, so as to maintain 
affordability for those with higher healthcare needs, by reversing the financial 
effects of risk selection and preserving the principles of cross subsidy from those 
of low healthcare needs to those with higher needs. It is not a requirement of risk 
equalisation to adjust for all variation in healthcare need or cost, mitigating that 
is the role of an insurance pool. However, it should adjust for predictable varia-
tion in risk between consumers that can 
be identified and used by insurers to risk 
select. These include variables such as age 
(healthcare cost at the level of the popula-
tion varies predictably by age); gender, 
chronic disease, and socio-economic 
factors. 
The design and calculation of risk equalisa-
tion is a complex actuarial exercise that we 
have described in detail elsewhere.21 The Dutch, over 20 years have progressively 
developed the most sophisticated risk equalisation scheme incorporating all of 
the above variables. Its other key feature is that it is mainly prospective. In other 
words, while the insurers compete for members on price of the community rated 
products they offer, the actual funding they receive from the total funding pool 
for a member depends on their risk profile. So an elderly member with a chronic 
disease will earn the insurer a significantly larger payment from the fund pool than 
a healthy young man, even though both contributed the same health insurance 
payroll tax and nominal premium into the funding pool. This incentivises the fund 
to seek to manage the cost of a person with large predicted cost through innova-
tion in care coordination and disease management strategies. 
Managing a sophisticated risk equalisation regime requires appropriate regulatory 
frameworks and structures and data. Australia operates a primitive risk equali-
sation arrangement in private health insurance, managed by the Private Health 
“ Its other key feature is that it is mainly prospective. In 
other words, while the insurers compete for members 
on price of the community rated products they offer the 
actual funding they receive from the total funding pool for 
a member depends on their risk profile.”
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Insurance Administration Council that provides the foundations for implementing 
the more sophisticated regulatory arrangement that would be required by a com-
peting health plan model.
Conclusion
Australia has a healthcare system to be proud of. Its funding model provides uni-
versal access and the technical quality of care is of top standard. To achieve that 
we currently spend over $5500 per person – all up over $130 billion – per year. 
Healthcare spending grew at an average of 5.3 per cent per year in real terms in 
the decade from 2000–01 to 2010–11. During this time real GDP growth aver-
aged 3.1 per cent per year, so health spending is increasing 70 per cent faster 
than GDP.22 Most of this increase is due to per person growth in utilisation of ser-
vices rather than due to demographic changes. Clearly this is not sustainable in 
the long term. For the Commonwealth Government, the major source of funding 
for healthcare, increased healthcare spending is the main cause of its projected 
fiscal imbalance and thus debt, starting around 2030 and escalating beyond. 
The longish timeframe before government healthcare funding becomes unsus-
tainable is part of the reform challenge. Because of the political nature of decision 
making about healthcare spending, the political strength of its vested interests and 
the emotive nature of the topic it is very difficult to make significant reform deci-
sions today to achieve policy outcomes in the (relatively distant) future. However, 
Australia has achieved reform with foresight 
in the past in other domains with such long 
term challenges. For example, the introduc-
tion of compulsory superannuation as part 
of the 1985 Prices and Incomes Accord 
to address the affordability of future state 
pensions23 and the introduction of the GST 
in 2000 to adjust the future tax base to the 
changing structure of the economy. The later also reminds us that such reforms 
can be a long time in the making, with a broad based consumption tax first 
mooted by the Labor Party in 1985.24 The Dutch healthcare reform of managed 
competition was 20 years in the making.
Long term sustainability of our universal health scheme will not be achieved by 
incremental changes to the current governance and stewardship arrangement. A 
step change will be required at some point. In this commentary it is argued that 
such a step will need to facilitate dynamic efficiency through the following design 
features:
Aggregation of all healthcare funding at the level of the individual, but with •	
financial risk residing in organisations at the meso level (such as competing 
health funds) through insurance arrangements. This will get rid of fragmentation 
and cost shifting and sets up the capacity for consumer choice and managed 
competition.
“ Long term sustainability of our universal health scheme 
will not be achieved by incremental changes to the 
current governance and stewardship arrangement. A 
step change will be required at some point.”
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Links public macro budgets through a formula to the economy’s capacity to •	
pay. This will maintain financial sustainability, enhance transparency and enable 
politicians to counteract pressure from vested interests.
Engages the whole adult community in responsibility for health funding through •	
transparent funding and consumer choice. The level of spending and constraints 
then reflect the aggregate result of consumer choice rather than vested interest 
politics.
Competing health plans engaging providers in bottom-up innovation in regard to •	
service utilisation and workforce productivity – replacing centralised top-down 
efforts at control.
The 2006 reforms in the Netherlands provide the guidelines for how such a step 
change could be designed. The current structure of the Australian healthcare 
system has the necessary components that could enable a consumer choice or 
managed competition model to be designed. The question remains, at what point 
will political and economic circumstances be such that governments will bite the 
bullet and truly reform Medicare to make it sustainable in the long term?
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This chapter examines options for reform to ensure 
future healthcare costs can be met more equitably 
and efficiently, including through pre-funding similar to 
compulsory superannuation. 
2.  Healthcare reform in an 
ageing Australia 
 Dr Vince FitzGerald 
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Introduction
In this paper I set out some ideas prompted by Professor Stoelwinder’s excel-
lent paper, Sustaining universal healthcare in Australia: Introducing dynamic 
efficiency,1 and by some earlier work of my own2 which examined how future 
healthcare costs might be provided for within a framework similar to that already 
in place to provide for future retirement income. I focus on the question of how to 
fund a reform model along Professor Stoelwinder’s lines in a way that is equitable 
between successive generations, and efficient in dealing with costs that are rising 
over time, without implying increasing tax rates and their attendant disincentive 
effects and consequent drag on economic growth.
I bring to the topic a “retirement policy” perspective, noting that healthcare needs, 
like retirement income needs, are heavily concentrated in old age. In Australia, 
as in many other countries, the ageing of the population implies large future rises 
in health costs, a large proportion of which is and will be publicly funded out of 
contemporaneously raised taxes. This poses, inter alia, intergenerational equity 
issues, potentially implying a significantly heavier tax burden on the next genera-
tion for the support of the present one – who will be the aged in the future and 
the recipients of a disproportionate share of healthcare services. 
Dr vince fitzGerald is a Principal with ACIL Allen Consulting and a former 
Chairman and Director of the Allen Consulting Group. He has written 
extensively on superannuation and saving, public finance and policy and 
healthcare reform. He is a CEDA Senior Research Fellow and member of its 
Council on Economic Policy, and a member of the Industry Advisory 
Committee of the Australian Centre for Financial Studies. He is a National 
Fellow of the Institute of Public Administration Australia.
He is also a Director of ETF Securities, The Conversation Media Group and the Goulburn-
Murray indigenous community’s Kaiela Institute, President of the Victorian State Council of 
the AICD and a member of its National Board, an ANU Council member and a Trustee of the 
Finkel and Tuckwell Foundations.
H e a l t H c a r e :  r e f o r m  o r  r a t i o n
32
H e a l t H c a r e :  r e f o r m  o r  r a t i o n
33
How can these rising future costs be met more equitably and efficiently? The 
answer to that, it seems to me, is to bring in a component of pre-funding, just 
as we now have for retirement income in the Superannuation Guarantee system. 
Through that system people accumulate savings while they are of working age, 
which are invested – ultimately in physical capital or other earning assets. These 
and other private savings will, in combination with the age pension, which will be 
taxpayer-funded in the future, pay for a significantly higher standard of living in 
retirement than would be feasible otherwise, while keeping the burdens on future, 
mainly young, taxpayers moderate. Can something similar be done to help pay 
for future healthcare needs?
The need for reform
Professor Stoelwinder has set out a strong case that our present healthcare 
system is unsustainable and in need of reform to address the root causes of its 
unsustainability:
Over the previous decade, healthcare spending in Australia grew at about •	
1.7 times the rate of growth of GDP (5.3 per cent vs 3.1 per cent p.a. in real 
terms);
Proximate drivers include demography (population growth and ageing – the •	
latter more a factor for the future than it has been in the past) and increas-
ingly expensive medical technology (including pharmaceuticals)3, but above all, 
increased per capita utilisation of healthcare services. Over the 1990s growth in 
utilisation contributed 3.2 per cent p.a. to the growth of healthcare costs (in real 
terms) vs population growth 1.2 per cent and ageing 0.5 per cent; and
In future, demographic factors will be somewhat more important, ageing in par-•	
ticular, but with the present system continuing, increases in utilisation per capita 
are expected still to dominate (accounting for 60 per cent of growth in costs). 
Commonwealth spending on health-
care, about four per cent of GDP at the 
beginning of the 2000s, is projected to 
rise to over seven per cent of GDP by 
mid-century.
While healthcare services are what 
economists term a “superior good” – one 
whose share in consumption will tend to 
rise somewhat in any event, as incomes 
rise – the consequences for public spending of proceeding with the status quo 
are concerning. They imply crowding out of other worthwhile public spending and 
rising burdens on future taxpayers (if they accept that), and the latter will in turn 
be a disincentive factor inhibiting economic participation and economic growth. 
It is for these reasons that one must conclude that the present system is not 
sustainable over the medium and longer term.
“ …increases in utilisation per capita are expected still to 
dominate (accounting for 60 per cent of growth in costs). 
Commonwealth spending on healthcare, about four per 
cent of GDP at the beginning of the 2000s, is projected to 
rise to over seven per cent of GDP by mid-century.”
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Underlying factors identified by Professor Stoelwinder in the increasing cost of 
healthcare – and in particular in utilisation (which is in principle controllable, but 
not being very effectively controlled) include:
Inhibitors to efficiency that are inherent in how the healthcare system is •	
organised, such as rigid patterns of reservation of tasks to particular profes-
sional and occupational groups; this (and the factors cited below) contribute to 
low or negative productivity improvement rates in healthcare;
A lack of sufficiently effective price signals, and in large parts of the healthcare •	
system, weak or absent countervailing influence of purchasers or funders over 
providers. Consequently moral hazard is endemic;4
Responsibility for funding healthcare is divided between the Commonwealth •	
and the states, for public or publicly funded provision; and overall, between 
them and (regulated) private health insurers, who largely fund private hospital 
and some other provisions. Individuals make some payments, e.g. as health 
insurance premiums and as co-payments for doctor visits and drugs; and
At root, as identified by Professor Stoelwinder, is the powerful influence on gov-•	
ernment of interest groups – particularly provider groups, but also healthcare 
recipients, both individuals and organised groups.
The last factor above, and the second last to an extent, are undoubtedly the ones 
that have most bedevilled attempts to achieve reform of the system. Nevertheless, 
as Professor Stoelwinder’s analysis makes clear, there must be reform if we are to 
maintain universal healthcare into the future in Australia on a sustainable basis.
Proposed reform model
Professor Stoelwinder sets out a description and commentary on reforms imple-
mented in the Netherlands from 2006, which were designed to tackle issues 
similar to those Australia faces. Drawing on that model, having regard to features 
of the Australian system, Professor Stoelwinder proposes a model of reform – or 
more precisely, a set of design principles for a reformed system. In essence they 
are:
1. Aggregation of all healthcare funding at the level of the individual;
2.  Financial risk to reside at a macro level above, in competing health funds 
through insurance arrangements;
3.  Elimination of fragmentation (of responsibility) and cost shifting;
4.  Development of a capacity for consumer choice and managed competition;
5.  Linkage of public healthcare budgets to economic capacity to pay – thereby 
introducing fiscal discipline and helping resist pressure from interest groups;
6.  Everyone facing some responsibility (for balancing healthcare choices against 
their cost) through transparency of costs and of who pays those costs, and 
consumer choice; and
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7.  Competing health funds engaging public providers to stimulate them to pursue 
“bottom up” innovation, addressing productivity and control of utilisation.
Observations on the proposed reform model
My observations on that reform model focus particularly on how it might be 
funded into the future. At the outset I note that if increasing utilisation continues to 
be a major driver of increasing cost, even if somewhat better controlled, then that 
in combination with demographic factors – increasingly ageing (noting that health-
care needs are strongly concentrated late in life) – implies continuing significantly 
increasing costs to public budgets, diversion 
of resources from other public spending and 
increasing burdens on future taxpayers, as well as 
increasing private costs – if healthcare costs are 
funded contemporaneously in the future.
The Dutch reform model’s link of funding to eco-
nomic capacity to pay is via a levy (a payroll tax) 
that is set to meet 50 per cent of the total costs of healthcare and is hypothecated 
to that purpose. General taxation meets five per cent (to pay for young people’s 
healthcare) and premiums to health funds plus some mandatory co-payments 
meet 45 per cent.
In Australia, Professor Stoelwinder points out, the present Medicare levy is really 
just an element of general taxation – it is not hypothecated – and it meets only a 
small fraction of the Commonwealth’s cost for healthcare. He quotes calculations 
that the levy would need to rise to 14 per cent to cover all those costs, or to 
seven per cent to cover half – and if that were done, there could be an offsetting 
reduction in other personal income tax to accommodate the increase in the levy. 
It would be hypothecated and adjusted as costs rose to rise in line with those.
There would also be premiums to health funds (which could be public or private), 
and co-payments, as in the Dutch model.
However, such a system still implies fully contemporaneous funding. The levy rate 
would need to rise steadily over time in any scenario, albeit after the effects of 
other elements of reform in restraining costs somewhat. While a hypothecated 
levy linked to cost increases would bring more fiscal discipline to bear, it would 
still act as a rising tax burden on individuals, and imply increasing marginal disin-
centives to economic participation. 
Elements in the proposed reform model which would help restrain cost increases 
are:
The aggregation of costs transparently at the level of the individual (but with risk •	
pooling on a community rated basis,5 avoiding “cherry picking” by funds); and
A framework allowing consumer choice among funds which in turn exercise •	
purchaser influence over providers, spurring innovation.
“ …the present Medicare levy is really just 
an element of general taxation – it is not 
hypothecated – and it meets only a small fraction 
of the Commonwealth’s cost for healthcare.”
H e a l t H c a r e :  r e f o r m  o r  r a t i o n
36
H e a l t H c a r e :  r e f o r m  o r  r a t i o n
37
However, no amount of fiscal discipline seems likely to fully inhibit the influence 
of interest groups on politics and governments, and it seems likely that costs of 
medical technology (including pharmaceuticals) will continue to rise. Thus while 
aggregate and public healthcare costs might rise less as a percentage of GDP 
than under the present system, they will still rise.
In short, such a system of funding would not really link healthcare funding for eco-
nomic capacity to pay. Rather, even if growth in healthcare costs were restrained 
somewhat by other elements of reform, the levy and premiums to health funds 
plus co-payments and other private payments would, as already noted, have to 
rise relative to incomes and GDP. In other words, the system would still place 
increasing strain on economic capacity pay, rather than fully restrain health spend-
ing to economic capacity.
Addressing capacity to pay
Whatever the relative contribution in the future of utilisation versus ageing and 
population growth, I would observe that the beneficiaries of future healthcare 
spending will be disproportionately the older group in the population, comprising 
a much bigger proportion of the population in the decades around mid-century 
than they do now. Depending on how far ahead one looks, members of that 
group are predominantly in the working age population at present, anywhere from 
early career onwards.
This gives rise to my observation (set out and elaborated in my papers cited 
earlier) that the problem of how to fund future health costs sustainably is closely 
analogous to the problem of how to fund future retirement income sustainably – 
which has been addressed by the compulsory Superannuation Guarantee system 
of pre-funding in combination with a contemporaneously funded age pension. 
The Superannuation Guarantee system ensures that, while they are still working 
and earning income, future retirees meet a 
considerable part of the cost of their own 
future retirement income provision. Accordingly, 
the burden on future taxpayers of funding that 
provision is restrained. On Treasury estimates 
which may now be a little out of date, compul-
sory saving for retirement via superannuation 
has reduced the future increase in the cost of 
the age pension (relative to its cost now) to 
one to two per cent of GDP – as well as ensuring a much higher standard of 
living for future retirees than would have been in prospect without compulsory 
superannuation.
It is very important to note that the significant net additional saving6 brought about 
by the compulsory superannuation system is invested either in additional capital 
in the Australian economy or additional earning assets overseas. Moreover, if 
the income earned is reinvested as the fund accumulates over perhaps several 
“ …no amount of fiscal discipline seems likely to 
fully inhibit the influence of interest groups on 
politics and governments, and it seems likely 
that costs of medical technology (including 
pharmaceuticals) will continue to rise.”
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decades, compound interest has very powerful effects.7 Wherever the funds 
are invested, future Australia will be more asset-rich, and that, as distinct from 
contemporaneous taxation – particularly personal taxation – will become a major 
source of funding for future needs.
In the series of papers written by me circa 2000, 
cited earlier, I observed that the projected future 
increase in the Commonwealth’s share of health-
care costs alone (not including the states’ or private 
costs) was roughly double the projected increase 
in the cost of the age pension (after allowing for 
compulsory super). I also observed that more than 
half of total healthcare costs (about 60 per cent as 
estimated then) would be incurred for the aged. 
It therefore seemed obvious that a pre-funding system for at least part of those 
future costs would be both more sustainable and inter-generationally fairer (small 
annual contributions now, mainly by the group that will be the future beneficiaries, 
to avoid, or reduce, heavy burdens on future taxpayers). The collection, adminis-
tration and investment systems already in place for superannuation – a collection 
network extending into every workplace and linking to competing providers of the 
other services – could be used for this purpose. 
A model very broadly of that type that I examined was the healthcare provision 
components of Singapore’s Central Provident Fund (CPF) system. These com-
prised (circa 2000):
A •	 Medisave account, receiving contributions of six to eight per cent of salary 
(age-stepped) until a certain maximum balance is achieved – any excess being 
swept to the person’s ordinary CPF account and available to them for retirement 
income provision or other permitted purposes;
Premiums (again age-phased) paid to the M•	 edishield scheme, insuring against 
catastrophic healthcare costs; and
A •	 Medifund safety net (funded from general taxation).
Such a scheme has much in common with that employed in the Netherlands 
and drawn upon in Professor Stoelwinder’s proposed design principles for reform 
– although there are significant differences. The similarities are the use of a combi-
nation of what is, in effect, a payroll or personal income tax which is hypothecated 
to pay for healthcare, premiums paid into a risk pool and a component of general 
taxation funding (along with co-payments and other private payments). 
One significant difference is that instead of competing funds exercising purchaser 
power and stimulating greater efficiency among providers, Singaporean individu-
als are expected to exercise that purchaser power. When purchasing healthcare 
services, they are using their own money (which would otherwise go to fund other 
needs), and except in the case of a catastrophic healthcare event, they meet the 
full cost – not just a co-payment. Transparency is complete and price signals are 
strong. 
“ …a pre-funding system for at least part 
of those future costs would be both more 
sustainable and inter-generationally fairer (small 
annual contributions now, mainly by the group 
that will be the future beneficiaries, to avoid, or 
reduce, heavy burdens on future taxpayers).”
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It is not clear, of course, whether the influence of purchasers on providers under 
such an individual purchaser-based system is likely to be as effective as under a 
“managed competition” framework such as Professor Stoelwinder envisages – in 
which competing health funds are well resourced, sophisticated and demanding 
purchases on behalf of their members. Those health funds (which could be public 
or private) would also operate community-rated risk pools, perhaps with some 
risk equalisation arrangements – i.e. direct or indirect cross-payments among 
funds – to make community rating effective, as in the Netherlands.
If a system were developed in 
Australia utilising a pre-funding com-
ponent (contributions of say three per 
cent of salaries,8 phased in, going into 
accumulation accounts to meet future 
needs), and premiums paid to health 
funds, as well as a substantial and 
fully hypothecated levy and a general 
taxation component to meet public 
costs, the funds built up through pre-
funding could be drawn upon in future by individuals to pay for premiums and 
co-payments and possibly the levy or some post-retirement substitute for the 
levy, perhaps at a reduced rate. 
Means testing principles would no doubt need to be applied to relevant elements 
of the funding system and to co-payments, and safety net arrangements would 
also need to be considered.
Conclusion
Professor Stoelwinder’s proposed design principles for reform, with or without the 
pre-funding component that I suggest, would imply a fundamental re-casting of 
our health system. One implication is that a purchaser/provider system within a 
managed competition framework would apply across the board, in both public 
and private sectors. This implies that all providers would be funded by purchas-
ers paying for services (outputs or possibly, if and where practical, outcomes). 
They would need to compete on a level playing field – e.g. with similar treatment 
of costs such as capital costs and tax or tax equivalents and with the cost of 
Community Service Obligations (CSOs) such as the training of new professionals 
neutrally shared by some appropriate mechanism. 
“ Implementation of reforms along the proposed lines would 
obviously pose an enormous degree of political difficulty. 
But it would have the potential to create an environment in 
which there are much stronger incentives for innovation, 
productivity improvement and better balancing of benefits 
and costs of healthcare choices.”
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It also implies that there would be great pressure to break down the present rigid 
patterns of reservation of tasks to particular professional or occupational groups 
and other inhibitors to productivity improvement or restrictions on competition, 
and thereby to develop more flexible and more efficient provision generally – con-
sistent with maintaining safety and quality.
Another implication is that there would need to be integrated administration, 
integrated public funding and unified regulation of the system. Obviously the 
Commonwealth would need to take the leadership role in the new system, but 
the states would be well placed to play key roles as well – in particular, in over-
sighting their own public providers (notably public hospitals), and possibly other 
providers in their territories, and in other aspects such as administering some of 
the regulatory frameworks. 
With regard to public funding, to the extent that it comes from general taxation – 
Commonwealth and state – the arrangements for sharing of that between the two 
levels need to be stable and to share the burdens and risks according to fiscal 
capacity and as far as possible to eliminate any opportunity for cost-shifting.
Implementation of reforms along the proposed lines would obviously pose an 
enormous degree of political difficulty. But it would have the potential to create 
an environment in which there are much stronger incentives for innovation, pro-
ductivity improvement and better balancing of benefits and costs of healthcare 
choices. Moral hazard would not be eliminated, but countervailing forces to it 
would be strengthened. It could be more fiscally sustainable and more consistent 
with economic capacity to pay – particularly with a pre-funding component.
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Endnotes
1 In this volume.
2  “Ideas for the Funding of Healthcare in the Context of the Ageing of the Population”, paper presented to Australian International Health 
Institute Symposium, November 1999, published in R. Galbally and J. Krupinski (eds), Reform, Re–design or Revolution: Health Agendas 
for the 21st Century, Australian International Health Institute (Melbourne University Ltd), 2000. A version of this paper with the same title 
was published in The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, Vol 26, No 1, January 2001, pp 114–125, and another version entitled 
“Saving for Future Healthcare Needs: Health Aspects of a Comprehensive Retirement Policy for Australia”, was published in Australian 
Health Review, Vol 23, No 3, 2000, pp 3–9.
3  One (possibly minor) element in this is the increasing use of medication to be taken on an ongoing (rather than episodic) basis – e.g. 
statins, used to control blood cholesterol.
4  It does not seem that, in general, doctors or other healthcare providers offer services that have no prospect of doing good, but if neither 
they nor their clients have a strong incentive to weigh costs into the balance (and providers may have the opposite incentive, as they 
will derive more income), then it is obvious that there is little economic (price signal) control over utilisation of services whose funding 
is not rationed – although rationing does substitute for price signals, to some extent, in parts of the system (notably public hospitals).
5  Community rating, as in the Dutch model, would be for “objective” risk factors only – such as age, gender, incidence of chronic disease, 
and not potentially controllable factors such as utilisation and provider unit costs.
6  For each dollar of compulsory saving, there is some partial offset in reduced other saving e.g. through people increasing debt, mainly 
housing debt, to finance additional consumption pre-retirement – i.e. reduced saving – in the expectation that they will be able to use 
part of a post-retirement superannuation lump sum to retire that debt. This sort of behaviour is permitted by allowing people to take all 
or much of their superannuation benefit as a lump sum.
7  E.g. at typical fund earning rates, to obtain $1 in say 30 years’ time would require just eight to 13 cents invested now.
8  When I first canvassed these ideas circa 2000, the Superannuation Guarantee contribution rate was being phased up to an ultimate 
rate of nine per cent. I suggested that three per cent for healthcare could be phased in beyond that, taking the combined total to 12 
per cent. Now that the Superannuation Guarantee rate is being phased up to 12 per cent without any ear-marking to healthcare, such 
ear-marking of part of the 12 per cent could be considered, or the 12 per cent increased somewhat.
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This chapter examines the rising cost of Australia’s 
Pharmaceuticals Benefits Scheme and options for 
reform which would help contain costs.
3.  The price is wrong: 
Pharmaceutical expenditure in 
Australia over the last decade 
and options for reform
 Professor Philip Clarke 
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Introduction
Just over 10 years ago the Australian Government’s first Intergenerational Report 
projected that the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) would be one of the 
fastest growing areas of expenditure.1 In his budget speech the then Treasurer 
Peter Costello noted that: “The Intergenerational Report projects that the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme could be the most significant area of pressure 
in the health budget and in 40 years’ time grow to around $60 billion in today’s 
terms.”2 As Figure 1(a) illustrates, in the last 20 years total PBS expenditure has 
risen from around $3.1 billion to $10.7 billion (of which $9.2 billion represents 
contributions from Government) in the 2011 financial year. At the time of the first 
Intergenerational Report in 2002, total Government expenditure was $7.6 billion 
in real terms. While the growth in the PBS has been lower at an average of four 
per cent pa in real terms in the past decade, than it was in the 1990s, it has still 
been rising faster than most other Government outlays.3 
What has tended to drive the rise in expenditure has been listing of new products. 
For example, subsidisation of Ranibizumab a therapy for treating the eye problem 
macular degeneration was recommended for listing in March 2007.4 At the time of 
listing it was forecast to cost more $100 million per year. Last year Ranibizumab 
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received the third highest overall subsidy of all drugs listed on the PBS at $308 
million per year.5 The other pressure has been from increased use of high volume 
drugs such as cholesterol lowering drugs known as statins. Figure 1(b) illustrates 
the total volume of scripts for all types of statins since 1992. While growth has 
slowed in recent years, use still almost doubled since the publication of the first 
Intergenerational Report in 2002 and they have consistently been the class of 
drugs that has received the highest subsidy from the PBS. For example, the total 
Government expenditure on atorvastatin since its listing on the PBS in the mid-
1990s exceeds $7 billion.6 It is for this reason that they are used as an example to 
illustrate problems with current policies in the sections below. 
Figure 1a 
pBs ExpEnDiturE ovEr timE
Source: PBS statistics, adjusted to 2012 dollars using the CPI.
Figure 1b 
totAl numBEr of sCripts on All stAtins
Source: PBS statistics from Medicare Australia.
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How can pharmaceutical costs be contained? 
There are three main approaches that governments can adopt. One strategy 
that the Howard Government adopted in 2005 was to reduce the PBS subsidies 
by increasing the patient contributions, as a way of shifting some pharmaceu-
tical costs from government to consumers. No doubt this had an impact on 
expenditure, but part of its effect was also to reduce dispensing of prescrip-
tion medications7 and it is unclear if these reductions can be justified clinically. 
PBS co-payments are now higher than in many comparable OECD countries. 
For example a study by Kemp8 indicates we rank fourth out of the 15 OECD 
countries with universal pharmaceutical subsidies. It is hard to see how additional 
increases would be consistent with one of the key goals of PBS to make medica-
tions affordable.9 
Another approach is to reduce or alter the quantities of drugs prescribed. Here 
there are two margins that Government can operate on. Firstly the listing of new 
types of pharmaceuticals can be stopped or delayed and this was explicitly a 
policy during part of 2011 when to save costs the listing of seven new medica-
tions recommended by the PBAC was deferred.10 Even before this policy came 
into effect there have been increasing delays in the listing medications on the 
PBS. As Pearce11 notes the average time from TGA approval of drug to PBS 
listing had increased steadily from 13.6 months in 2000 to 34.2 months in 2009. 
While these delays no doubt reduce upward pressures on PBS expenditure, they 
also impact on the welfare of Australian patients who are denied access to the 
latest pharmaceuticals. 
A second approach is switching consumers from more expensive to cheaper 
drugs within the same therapeutic class. For example, there are four main types 
of statins and while there are differences in the degree to which they lower cho-
lesterol and in some side-effects there is considerable scope for substituting 
between them. In Australia there has been 
very high use of higher cost statins when 
they are under patent. Just prior to expiry 
of the patent on atorvastatin in 2012 PBS 
data indicate that prescriptions for off-patent 
(simvastatin and pravastatin) constituted only 
22 per cent of statins prescribed in Australia 
at that time. In contrast, generic statins com-
prised more than 50 per cent of prescriptions 
in the United States and over 75 per cent in 
England at that time.12 The high use of pat-
ented formulations in Australia has substantially contributed to the increase in 
PBS expenditures. Clarke and Fitzgerald (2010) estimated that spending on the 
PBS could have been reduced by $1087 million prior to 2009 if generic substitut-
ing of statins had matched that of England. 
Why are Australians such high users of patented drugs? In the United States the 
price difference between patented and generic formulations is typically very large 
“ The high use of patented formulations in Australia 
has substantially contributed to the increase in PBS 
expenditures. Clarke and Fitzgerald (2010) estimated 
that spending on the PBS could have been reduced 
by $1087 million prior to 2009 if generic substituting 
of statins had matched that of England.”
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and so there are incentives for consumers and other payers such as HMOs to opt 
for drugs which are off patent. In England the greater use can be traced to spe-
cific recommendations of peak bodies such as the National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence (NICE), which is the English equivalent to the Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Advisory Committee. In the case of statins NICE recommended that patients be 
initiated on the lower cost versions of these drugs13 and the high generic use sug-
gests this recommendation was widely followed. In Australia there have been few 
incentives for patients or GPs to choose generic versions of the drugs and this 
represents a major weakness of the PBS scheme. 
The final option for the control of PBS expenditure is to reduce drug prices. 
Again this can be applied when negotiating the listing of new drugs, or the prices 
paid for existing drugs, particularly when their patent expires. The last time the 
Productivity Commission undertook an international comparison of pharmaceuti-
cal prices was prior to the publication of the first Intergenerational Report.14 At 
that time bilateral comparisons indicated that overall prices were low in Australia 
compared to many OECD countries (e.g. prices paid in the United Kingdom were 
around 50 per cent higher). The lower prices attained under the PBS were the 
subject of criticism by the United States Government, of Australia’s pharmaceuti-
cal pricing policies. In particular in 2004 the US Department of Commerce argued 
that features of the PBS including reference pricing (in which all drugs within 
the same therapeutic group receive the same price) and monopsonistic buying 
powers that flow from having a national scheme meant that prices for patented 
drugs were substantially lower in Australia.15 
The price Australia pays for its generic drugs have received less attention. Before 
the recent reforms (see below) Australia had no systematic way of reducing the 
price of generic drugs beyond a relatively small regulatory cut in the price after 
patent expiry. 
Reforms to the PBS
The pricing of pharmaceuticals in Australia has also undergone significant 
changes in recent years. As indicated above, reference pricing has traditionally 
been an important feature of the PBS system of pricing pharmaceuticals. This 
involved PBS subsidies to patients being set at the level of the lowest-priced drug 
in a therapeutically equivalent group.16 If a generic equivalent for a drug became 
available at a lower price, the level of reimbursement was reset to that lower price 
for all drugs in the therapeutic class. However, this policy was modified in July 
2005 when atorvastatin was deemed by the PBAC to have greater efficacy and 
so was granted a price premium.17 
The scope of reference pricing was further reduced in 2007, when the PBS was 
divided into two separate formularies: F1 is intended for single-brand patented 
medications (this currently includes atorvastatin); and F2 is for medications whose 
patent has expired and for which generic medications can become available (this 
includes simvastatin and pravastatin).This split in the formulary greatly reduced 
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the potential for the expanded range of generic medications to reduce PBS 
expenditure as price reductions of drugs listed on F2 will not affect the prices of 
those that remain on F1 that were formerly in the same therapeutic class.18 
Other reforms in 2007 included a regulatory price cut to some generics of 25 per 
cent and a move to a system price disclosure in which the price the Government 
pays reflects the actual price at which the medicine is being sold. The 2007 
reforms were in part motivated by the need to address the high relative cost of 
generics in Australia. As Tony Abbott the then Minister for Health and Ageing 
noted at the time: 
“The common cholesterol-lowering drug simvastatin, which currently costs the PBS 
about $300 million a year, we here in Australia pay more than $50 for this drug. In 
the UK, they pay less than $10 for that drug. Now the difference in price under our 
system as it currently stands is mostly accruing to pharmacists by way of discounts 
and so what we are trying to do with these changes is to harvest most of those 
discounts for the benefit of taxpayers.”19 
This system of price disclosure was also the basis of the most recent agreement 
between the Department of Health and Ageing and the peak industry body, 
Medicines Australia, dating from May 2010.20 This agreement commonly known 
as the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) included a provision to reduce 
the price of older medications on the PBS, starting with regulated reductions of 
between two and five per cent for existing off-patent medications and a 16 per 
cent reduction when a drug’s patent expires. After a period of almost two years 
the price would then be determined through a policy known as expanded and 
accelerated price disclosure, in which pharmaceutical companies were legally 
obliged to reveal to the government the actual price at which they sell their prod-
ucts to pharmacies. Future prices are then set using a weighted average of these 
disclosed prices. Importantly, in return for these cuts, the Australian Government 
agreed not to introduce any further price savings during the four year term of the 
agreement. In effect the MOU fixed the price setting arrangements for around $36 
billion worth of pharmaceutical expenditure. 
The first round of these price disclosure reductions came into effect in April 
2012. What became clear is that discounting in wholesale price of generics was 
pervasive to the retail pharmacy sector.21 The government pays a fixed fee to 
pharmacists each time a drug on the PBS is dispensed, which is intended to 
cover the cost to the pharmacist of the drug, a mark-up by the pharmacist, and 
dispensing and any other fees. 
A recent study indicated that the dispensed price of generic simvastatin 20 mg 
was $34 in 2011, $22 of which is intended to cover its wholesale cost.22 The price 
reductions from the first round of price disclosures for simvastatin indicate that 
pharmacists have actually been paying, on average, $10 for this drug.23 Using 
data from Medicare Australia, it is possible to estimate that total PBS payments 
to cover the wholesale cost of all doses of simvastatin amounted to around $150 
million between May 2010 and October 2011. Price disclosure data reveal that 
pharmacies only spent $70 million on the drug, due to discounts from manu-
facturers and kept the additional $80 million PBS payments. Five years after the 
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2007 reforms, pharmacists continued to receive very large financial benefits from 
discounting of generic drugs.
These discounts are likely to be a continuing feature of the Australian system, in 
part because many new drugs are coming off patent. For example it has been 
widely reported that pharmacists have been offered discounts of 90 per cent on 
Atorvastatin24 after its patent expiry in 2012. While the disclosure of these dis-
counts will reduce future prices, it is a slow adjustment mechanism, as a reduction 
in the supply price under current arrangements takes more than 18 months to 
produce savings for the PBS. 
Some international price comparisons
There have been no recent comprehensive international comparisons of phar-
maceutical prices conducted by the Department of Health and Ageing or other 
Australian Government agencies such as the Productivity Commission. Other 
countries such as England regularly undertake such comparisons.25 Most recently 
the Office of Health Economics (which is the peak pharmaceutical industry body 
in the United Kingdom) provided an updated estimates of the comparative price 
level, calculated using a basket of the top 250 most prescribed drugs in 2011 
Figure 2 
intErnAtionAl CompArison* of Ex-mAnufACturEr priCEs
Notes: 
Selected drugs from annual PBS expenditure statistics of the highest cost to Government in 2011–12 ranked in order of total cost.
* Comparisons based on five year average of the exchange rate between 2008–12 of $1=0.57 pence.
+ Price of atorvastatin in Australia takes into account the 25 per cent reduction on 1 Dec, 2012.
Sources: Data calculated from PBS schedule (Jan 2013); England from Category M price lists (Jan 2013).
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in England and used this to compare against 13 countries, including Australia.26 
At current exchange rates, overall prices in Australia are higher than in all other 
countries except for Germany and the United States. For example, prices are 40 
per cent higher than in the UK. While some of the difference is the high exchange 
rate, even using a five-year average Australia is still paying higher prices amount-
ing to more than $1.5 billion of extra government expenditure through the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme every year. 
The major contributor to the higher prices are very substantial cost differences for 
many generic drugs. Figure 2 compares eight generics which were receiving the 
largest total subsidy under the PBS in 2011/12. The price differences range from 
around two (IRBESARTAN) to almost 30 times higher (Olanzapine) in Australia, 
with the average being around a ten-fold difference in prices. These eight drugs 
collectively amount to around $1.3 billion of Government expenditure per year 
and if Australia had paid prices equivalent to England, savings of more than a 
billion a year could have been attained. 
A key driver of the higher prices has been the weak mechanisms for adjustment in 
the prices of drugs when their patent expires. It is instructive to examine changes 
in the price of simvastatin since the expiry of its patent in 2005. Figure 3 provides 
such a comparison of prices in England27 and Australia. At the time of introduc-
tion of price disclosure, prices were around five times higher in Australia than 
England. While there have been price reductions the relative difference between 
the countries has been maintained. What it also illustrates is the hidden cost of the 
changes to the pricing system established under the MOU in 2010. Rather than 
continue to implement cuts flowing from the existing system of price disclosure, 
the Government agreed to holt these cuts for a two-year period and only impose 
small regulatory price cuts between two to five per cent for generic drugs until the 
new system came into effect in April 2012. The price we are currently paying for 
simvastatin follows its long term trend, so it is unclear how current policies have in 
any way “accelerated” price disclosure. 
Figure 3 
priCE of simvAstAtin 40mG in AustrAliA*
Notes: *Comparisons based on five year average of the exchange rate between 2008-12 of $1=0.57 pence.
Source: Prices calculated from various PBS schedules and for England from Category M price lists.
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Even after the first round of price disclosure, prices of generics are still high com-
pared with other countries (see Figure 4). Australia’s ranking in regard to the price 
it pays for Simvastatin has gone from highest to third highest. 
Current state of play
Since the mid-2000s the patents of an increasing number of widely used phar-
maceuticals have been expiring and many Governments in other countries have 
taken advantage of this dividend from the lack of technological change to dramati-
cally lower prices of generics. In this context it is particularly hard to understand 
the policy objectives of the Australian Government’s pharmaceutical pricing policy. 
It is six years since the introduction of price disclosure and generic prices are still 
vastly higher than those other countries overseas. Given the first Intergenerational 
Report highlighted the need for measures to reduce pharmaceutical expenditure a 
decade ago, it is unclear why successive Australian Governments have struggled 
to reduce the price of generic drugs.
There is surprising little public rationale for why the Australian Government entered 
into the MOU with Medicines Australia in 2010. Unlike patented drugs there is no 
need to negotiate with an individual monopoly supplier and governments in other 
countries that face high generic prices have undertaken major reforms without an 
explicit agreement from industry.28 The Department of Health and Ageing website 
has an explanation that is just a few lines long. It mentions the “need to provide 
some certainty about pricing policy for the Australian pharmaceutical industry”, 
while giving Australians access through the PBS to a wide range of pharmaceuti-
cals “at the lowest possible prices for consumers”.29 
Figure 4 
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If it’s an industry policy, paying more than a billion dollars a year extra on generics 
is an expensive one. In 2007 the industry claimed there were just over 14,000 jobs 
in pharmaceutical manufacturing in Australia, only a proportion of which are likely 
to be producing generics.30 As these generic drugs were developed long ago, 
paying high prices for them is like assisting the Australian car industry by subsi-
dising the price of second-hand cars. Policies that maintain high generic prices 
are an inefficient form of industry assistance and potentially highly distortionary. 
Why would a pharmaceutical company invest in any new research when there is 
such a high profit margin in Australia on selling generics? Further, if savings from 
reducing the generics are reallocated to fund the listing of new drugs the effect on 
pharmaceutical industry as a whole are likely to be relatively minor. While those 
firms selling generics will lose from pricing reforms, firms manufacturing new inno-
vative products will gain as they will face much greater certainty about the timing 
of the listing of their products. 
The pharmacy sector is also a major beneficiary of current policies, particularly 
since 2012 when atorvastatin came off patent. Pharmacists already receive 
very large taxpayer funded subsidies to provide services through the 5th Guild – 
Government Community Pharmacy Agreement which totals over $15 billion over 
five years.31 Each billion dollars in discounts translates into an additional $200,000 
per pharmacy – what additional services are they providing to justify these pay-
ments from Government? 
The main losers from these policies are people with chronic diseases who must 
pay higher prices relative to other countries for many common medications. Take 
for example a person who is not eligible for a concession card, the cost of one 
year’s supply of Simvastatin 40mg in Australia is around $275 (i.e. 12 months 
at $22.78 per month). To put this into perspective, in the United States a year’s 
supply of the same drug could be purchased from a retail pharmacy for only 
$60.32 
Lowering the cost of generics medications not only benefits consumers financially, 
but has the potential to significantly improve overall health as the prescribing of 
many generic medications should be expanded as their cost declines. Again 
taking cholesterol as an example, a large drop in its price should also be coupled 
with its much wider use. A recent synthesis of all major clinical studies sug-
gests there is compelling evidence of benefit to lower risk patients33 (Cholesterol 
Treatment Trialists’ Collaborators 2012), but it is much less cost-effective to treat 
such patients if generic statins remain at high cost. Increasing the volume of 
generic prescribing of lower cost generics would also benefit the pharmaceutical 
industry and pharmacists. 
Given this evidence it is hard not to conclude that current generic pharmaceutical 
price setting arrangements are subject to a high degree of regulatory capture and 
have a considerable negative impact on economic welfare.
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Where to now?
The current pricing agreement with Medicines Australia is due to expire in July 
2014. The Government has only indicated that it would enter into discussion with 
representatives from the Pharmaceutical Industry and the Consumers Health 
Forum to develop a framework for pharmaceutical pricing after expiry of the 
MOU.34 To put the pricing agreement into context, the existing MOU involves the 
purchase of around $36 billion dollars’ worth of pharmaceuticals over its four year 
duration. The one-off cost of purchasing or constructing submarines to replace 
the Collins Class has been estimated to be around the same amount. In the May 
2012 budget, the Government committed over $200 million to conduct studies to 
assist the decision on replacement submarines. There has also been an extensive 
discussion and analysis about the relative merits of purchasing submarines from 
overseas, or constructing them locally.35 There has been no similar process of 
evaluation or debate around the purchasing of pharmaceuticals despite a poten-
tially much larger ongoing cost. Nor is the generic pricing issue on the “to do” list 
of the Productivity Commission.36 
If it is the aim of the current or a future Australian Government to reduce generic 
prices to levels that are comparable to the rest of the world there are a variety 
of policy options that could be pursued. At a minimum the existing system of 
price disclosure needs improvement. A key limitation of the Australian system is 
the slow rate at which prices are adjusted. The existing MOU specifies that each 
price disclosure cycle which is the period before which prices can be adjusted is 
18 months. England also employs a system of price disclosure but it has quar-
terly rather than annual cycles. Reducing the price cycle to match that of England 
alone would save many hundreds of millions of dollars.37 It is also unclear why 
the initial regulated price cut is only 16 per cent in Australia. When a generic is 
introduced its price typically declines more than 50 per cent in the first year.38 
It is important to note, that existing recommendations for price reforms have not 
been implemented. After a recent review, the PBAC recently recommended fixing 
the price difference between atorvastatin and simvastatin to an average of 12.5 
per cent. This review was in response to a request from the Australian Senate 
at the time it passed the MOU. While pharmaceutical manufacturers voluntarily 
cut the price of atorvastatin by 25 per cent, it is not sufficient to meet the PBAC 
recommendation and the Government has not enforced further cuts at a cost of 
$260 million annually for taxpayers and consumers.39 
More substantive options to consider are use of external reference pricing or the 
introduction of a tending system especially for high volume generic drugs. 
External reference pricing involves using a basket of prices from other countries 
as a benchmark when setting domestic pharmaceutical prices. It is widely used 
in Europe with 24 out of the 27 countries within the European Union using a form 
of external reference pricing.40 While such an approach effectively transfers the 
determination of price setting to other markets (which may not experience the 
same conditions) its implementation would avoid the current situation where 
Australia pays some of the highest prices in the world for many generic drugs. 
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Tendering processes were pioneered in New Zealand by its Pharmaceutical 
Management Agency PHARMAC and these can dramatically lower the prices of 
generic drugs. For example Pfizer, manufacturer of Lipitor, recently won the tender 
to supply a generic version of this drug for between $1–$5 per month depend-
ing on dose. While in Australia the comparable ex-manufacturer price is currently 
between $18 and $54 per month. Tendering processes have been adopted in 
The Netherlands and Germany41 and are already employed by state governments 
in Australia for the supply of pharmaceuticals for use in hospitals. Such a tender 
could be conducted at national level for the right to supply certain categories of 
drugs on the PBS. 
A key difference between PBAC and PHARMAC is that the latter effectively 
manages a capped pharmaceutical budget in New Zealand. While in Australia 
the PBS is uncapped, the PBAC can only make recommendations that must be 
approved by Federal cabinet for any drug costing over $10 million. Given that 
such drugs have been through a rigorous economic evaluation by the PBAC 
before they are recommended, it is unclear on what basis the cabinet is making 
its decisions to approve or delay listings. In New Zealand PHARMAC can real-
locate the savings from reducing prices of generics to list new drugs without an 
explicit cabinet approval. There are now several drugs such as the anti-coagulant 
dabigatran that have not been listed on the PBS despite positive recommenda-
tions by the PBAC,42 but are subsidised in New Zealand.
To summarise, the purpose of this policy review has been to highlight deficiencies 
in the aspects of the PBS and to make the case for reform. It is highly inefficient 
for Australia to pay prices for generics that are often an order of magnitude higher 
than those in comparable countries such as England. In the current tight fiscal 
environment high generic prices greatly limits the scope for listing new therapies 
or expanding use of effective medications such as statins. Hence current policies 
have detrimental health as well as financial consequences. A necessary precondi-
tion for reform will be to instigate a policy development process that goes beyond 
limited stakeholder consultations to one that is open and transparent and explic-
itly considers the best long terms outcomes for all Australians. 
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This chapter examines Australia’s comparative 
advantage in medical research, export opportunities 
and challenges and the policy changes needed to 
support innovation.
4.  Ensuring Australia’s 
comparative advantage in 
biotechnology 
 Dr Anna Lavelle
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“Biology is likely to become the greatest single driver of the global economy...The life 
code is a lever and perhaps the most powerful instrument human beings have ever 
used. It will make the Industrial Revolution seem simple, even quaint. It will become 
the world’s dominant language, and all of us will have to be literate to thrive.”
Juan Enriquez 
Managing Director at Excel Venture Management and Founding Director of Harvard Business School’s Life Sciences Project. 
He also serves on a number of boards including The Genetics Advisory Council of Harvard Medical School 
and The Chairman’s International Council of the America’s Society.
Since its emergence in the early to mid-90s, the biotechnology industry in 
Australia has achieved a great deal in its short and productive history. 
Respected commentators and intellectuals agree that biotechnological innova-
tion is the foundation-stone of our future, and a game changer. It is anticipated 
that it will underpin our economy and provide solutions to intractable problems of 
human and animal diseases, climate change, fuel alternatives, food security – as 
well as improving our quality of life. 
Despite the challenges of the global economy and the degree of difficulty in build-
ing a biotechnology and life sciences sector from scratch, Australia is doing very 
well by any comparative measure, with an impressive return on investment from 
a maturing stock of quality companies. Australian biotechnology boasts a raft of 
success stories and a world-class industry. 
Dr Anna lavelle was appointed inaugural Chief Executive Officer of 
AusBiotech in June 2005. Previously Dr Lavelle was an Executive with the 
Australian Red Cross Blood Service (ARCBS) commencing in 1998 as Director 
responsible for Strategic Planning and Business Development. 
In 2002, Dr Lavelle was appointed Director of Intellectual Capital and was 
responsible for management of the national research and development 
program, evaluation of emerging technologies and international and national business 
development activities including technology transfer and intellectual property management.
Prior to joining ARCBS, Dr Lavelle held positions of Chief Executive Officer of a public health 
organisation, industry lobbyist for a member organisation and was an academic at Monash 
University, Melbourne. Dr Lavelle holds a Doctor of Philosophy in Genetics from the 
University of Melbourne.
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Australia is already a leading location for biotechnology companies with over 
900 biotechnology companies (400 therapeutics and diagnostics and 500 – 900 
medical technology companies)1. The Australian biotechnology sector is still dom-
inated by human therapeutics companies, but encompasses the fast-growing 
sectors of agriculture, food technology, medical devices and diagnostics, indus-
trial applications and cleantech.
With respect to industry credentials, there are currently 100 ASX-listed life sci-
ences companies, with a market capitalisation of $40.7 billion.2 In a global context, 
the Australian biotech sector boasts the largest listed biotechnology sector as a 
proportion of GDP in the world3.
In addition, the PricewaterhouseCoopers 10 year report4 shows the Australian 
Life Sciences Index has consistently outperformed the NASDAQ Composite 
Index and the All Ordinaries since mid-2006. Despite the GFC and the reduction 
in venture capital availability, biotechnology has delivered to investors.
Take away the three majors from the Life Sciences Index 
and in 2008 the Index parted ways with the All Ordinaries 
and has dramatically out-performed it since, almost qua-
drupling its performance in the latest reading. In four years 
the often-cited index has failed to come anywhere close 
to biotechnology’s SME performance.
The NASDAQ Biotech Index, perhaps the best compara-
tive measure of US biotechs, hit a 12-year high in July, but is nevertheless trailing 
behind the performance of the Australian Life Sciences Index. Admittedly the 
Australian stocks have come off a lower base but the result demonstrates that a 
portfolio approach is an attractive investment option.
Australia’s comparative advantage comes from its world-class science and 
medical research, its capacity for international partnerships, cost effectiveness, 
and a transparent and effective regulatory system. More recently the Federal 
Government has introduced a research and development tax incentive, which is 
attracting global investor attention.
Times have changed since we perceived ourselves as an industrialised country 
or simply a mine and a farm. We now prefer to think of ourselves as a smart 
country, where we compete on a world stage in the knowledge economy. Along 
with the trend in all developing and growing countries, the shift from industrialisa-
tion to the service and knowledge industries is well underway. For example, the 
factors of production in the 20th Century – land, labour and capital – have been 
superseded in the 21st Century by creative, human and social capital. We live in a 
time where technological innovation, knowledge and networking are the drivers of 
our productivity. Australia has expertise in these areas that could and should be 
leveraged to our economy’s advantage. 
Jobs of the future will be found in innovative industries like biotechnology. The bio-
technology industry already provides an estimated 40,000 direct Australian jobs5 
in the biotech and pharmaceuticals sector, plus at least 10,3206 in the medical 
technology sector. In addition, there are many thousands of direct jobs in the 
agricultural and industrial biotechnology sectors and indirect jobs in dependent 
“ In a global context, the Australian 
biotech sector boasts the largest listed 
biotechnology sector as a proportion of 
GDP in the world.”
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areas such as clinical trial teams, high-tech manufacturing, medical research and 
supplies to the medical technology sector and in services such as those provided 
by patent attorneys. Innovative industries provide high-skilled jobs with long term 
prospects.
When it comes to fundamental discovery in science and biomedical research, 
Australia is a legitimate and impressive global contributor, producing three per 
cent of the world’s research publications with only 0.3 per cent of the population. 
However, our ability to translate this strength into tests, cures, treatments and 
vaccines to benefit the Australian community could be so much better than it is 
currently.
The Global Innovation Index7 ranks Australia 13th 
in terms of innovation input and 31st in innovation 
output. Impressive, but when these figures are 
converted to an innovation efficiency ratio of output 
over input, Australia dives to a ranking of 107 out of 
141 countries assessed. This stark measure shows 
that Australians are brilliant at coming up with ideas 
but inefficient at translating them into products. 
In a recent submission to the (McKeon) Strategic 
Review of Health and Medical Research on how to increase the levels of com-
mercially sponsored translation of research, the Association of Australian Medical 
Research Institutes (AAMRI) used triadic patents to measure commercialisation 
success, as these patents are registered for the same invention in the US, Europe 
and Japan. AAMRI found Australia ranks 20th in the OECD in terms of triadic 
patents per capita, which accounts for less than 0.8 per cent of the world’s triadic 
patents.
AAMRI said: “Australia’s commercial translation of Government-funded research 
is poor by international standards…This represents tens of thousands of inven-
tions not capitalised on each year, and means as a nation we are losing out on 
returns on our investment in research in terms of attracting private and foreign 
investment for product development, profits from the sale of products, taxation 
revenue, and patient benefits.” 
So why is Australia’s performance so poor in translating its demonstrated 
advantage in the area of biotech innovation into products and services for the 
community? 
One often-cited reason is the poorly-targeted and under-resourced government 
programs for commercialisation, particularly at the early stages of company 
development. Australia’s biopharmaceutical industry outperforms the wine or 
automotive industries’ exports and yet there is still little industry support for com-
mercialisation in the life sciences sector.
The Federal Government spends more than $8 billion annually8 on research and 
experimental development, with about 98.5 per cent provided to the research 
end of the spectrum, leaving only about 1.5 per cent of that spent on commer-
cialisation: translating the research into products. It is estimated that half of the 
commercialisation funding goes to the automotive industry.
“ When it comes to fundamental discovery in 
science and biomedical research, Australia is 
a legitimate and impressive global contributor, 
producing three per cent of the world’s 
research publications with only 0.3 per cent 
of the population.”
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It’s often said in industry circles that the Australian Government is good at sup-
porting the research end of the R&D spectrum, but the development end is 
continually left wanting. Different types of government support is needed, from 
direct industry assistance to business environment changes like taxation and 
reduced compliance costs.
It takes a minimum of 6.3 years for evidence to reach peer-reviewed publication, 
followed by an average of 9.3 years to implement the evidence into clinical prac-
tice. It takes an average of 12 years and $1 billion dollars to bring a medicine 
from discovery to regulatory approval. This is an area that requires long term and 
patient investment, well beyond the scope of an electoral cycle.
In reality Australia’s manufacturing cannot compete on high volume, low cost 
manufacturing, especially with Asia. However, we do have a competitive and 
comparative advantage in high tech, high cost, low volume manufacturing, for 
example as is used in the production of elaborately transformed goods such as 
medical devices and biologics (large molecule pharmaceuticals), which are the 
future of medicines. 
Australia’s comparative advantage is shining through as pharmaceutical manu-
facturing exports are on the rise. Pharmaceuticals have officially taken over as 
Australia’s number one export, with $4.1 billion in 2011–12. This is substantially 
more than the car industry at $2.8 billion and more than double the wine industry 
at $2 billion, for the same period. This illustrates the economic significance of the 
sector to Australia and provides a very different view from 20 years ago. 
While there is huge sympathy for those whose jobs are under threat as Australia 
structurally changes, the fact remains that the shift from the industrial revolution 
to the knowledge revolution is irreversible and pervasive. The macroeconomic 
shifts will bring different opportunities in the future and if we can plan and re-train 
appropriately, all Australians will benefit across the spectrum of jobs. 
Manufacturing can and will play a role in the future prosperity of Australia by pro-
viding diversity that will underpin the economy with added strength and greater 
resilience, if we are able to let go of our traditional views and re-shape our thinking 
to play to our comparative strengths. That strength is in niche pockets of high-
tech manufacturing; it’s in our science and medical research capabilities; it’s in 
our ability to incubate innovative companies that return benefits to our economy 
as well as our lifestyle. This path will lead to a more sustainable future and new 
industries and employment opportunities. 
As we as a nation position ourselves and build for the future as best we can, 
there appears to be a growing disconnect between the rhetoric – what we say we 
believe will be good for our future – and Australia’s public policy actions. 
As the window of mining-driven prosperity shows signs of closing, it is widely 
acknowledged that building Australia’s capacity as a technologically innovative 
country is vital for our economic future. We largely agree that high-tech industries 
generate globally competitive economies and sustainable jobs. 
H e a l t H c a r e :  r e f o r m  o r  r a t i o n
60
H e a l t H c a r e :  r e f o r m  o r  r a t i o n
61
The introduction of the $1.8 billion Research and Development (R&D) Tax Incentive 
program legislation last year was a momentous and pivotal inflection point for 
Australian innovation; the type we as a community will look back on in admiration 
and congratulate its architects’ foresight. It was the culmination of years of cam-
paigning and planning that was initially flagged as part of the Australian Innovation 
Review of 2008, known as the Cutler Review. 
The specifically-targeted program offers a 45 per cent cash refund for eligible 
research and development for companies with turnover under $20 million and a 
40 per cent offset for other companies. 
Funds are now flowing back into the industry, particularly to small companies in 
the technology sector, to be re-invested, and the interest of overseas investors 
has grown rapidly, leading to increased foreign direct investment in Australian 
companies. 
Disappointingly, less than two months after the Incentive’s application form was 
released last year, the 40 per cent offset was under threat, from the Treasury-
appointed Business Tax Working Group. The Group recommended the reduction 
or removal of the offset as a trade-off for a corporate tax cut. Industry representa-
tives, including AusBiotech, opposed the plan and the Group abandoned its plan 
to wind back the program. Since then, 
the February 2013 launch of the Federal 
Government’s innovation and industry 
plan included the capping of the offset 
to exclude companies with turnover over 
$20 billion. 
The episode underscores a huge 
problem for industry: the uncertainty that 
is being created by continual government 
consultations on the same issues, such 
as patents, and sudden policy changes. The negative impact that uncertainty of 
policy and funding support has on product development/innovation companies is 
terribly destabilising and the Government’s actions in making program changes 
cause substantial costs to business, in practical terms.
While governments around the world are making strong and large commitments 
to build the foundation stones of innovation-driven economies, Australia is con-
sulting. Countries as diverse as the UK, Israel and China, understand the need for 
nation building based on innovation and have made strong commitments. They 
understand the need for long term, uninterrupted, cleverly-targeted government 
investment based on intelligent planning and bipartisan support. 
Amid the raft of Federal Government consultations and reviews in recent months, 
a record number of which impact biotechnology, the Strategic Review of Health 
and Medical Research in Australia, also known as the McKeon Review released 
a discussion paper after the first phase of its consultation. Its job was to recom-
mend a 10-year strategic health and medical research plan for the nation, which 
it did at the end of 2012. While the final report is currently being considered by 
“ While governments around the world are making 
strong and large commitments to build the foundation 
stones of innovation-driven economies, Australia is 
consulting. Countries as diverse as the UK, Israel and 
China, understand the need for nation building based on 
innovation and have made strong commitments.”
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Government before publication, it is expected to reflect the draft report, which 
called for at least three per cent of Australian and state and territory government 
health expenditure (an additional $2–3 billion per year) over the next 10 years to 
be invested in research to deliver a better health system.
Like its response to the Cutler Review of innovation, AusBiotech warmly wel-
comed the draft report’s recommendations, particularly the themes in regard to 
the translation of research outcomes into health and economic benefits for the 
Australian community. The biotechnology community welcomed the well-articu-
lated plan to build our nation’s healthcare, although the industry would like to see 
stronger commercialisation recommendations and a commitment to implement 
them. 
AusBiotech recently responded to the Prime Minister’s Science, Engineering and 
Innovation Council (PMSEIC), Chaired by Professor Chubb, which asked:
“What are the top breakthrough actions that the Commonwealth and state/territory 
government, research agencies, universities and the business community can take to 
utilise Australia’s substantial research capability to contribute to national productivity 
growth through innovation?” 
AusBiotech made a submission recommending the following actions be 
addressed:
1) Articulating innovation as a priority
There is a need for governments to consistently articulate the importance of inno-
vation to our future and how we see ourselves as a nation. It will take time to 
permeate, but if that attitude can flow through governments to the general public, 
then it will mean a substantiative change in the way we approach investment in 
high-technology industries, such as scientific and medical research.
Improving innovation in Australia requires it to be placed as and talked about as a 
national priority, particularly by governments. We have a strong education system, 
stable government, good regulatory and legal environment and a proven track 
record in innovation – although this is not widely known. 
In contrast, Australians and often their governments still perceive their future 
nation more as a mine, farm or factory. Take the recent report by the Prime 
Minister’s Manufacturing Taskforce. While the report gives a cursory nod to 
advanced manufacturing in pharmaceuticals and medical devices, it proposes 
little to promote those high technology industries and a lot to save existing low 
technology manufacturers, which are clearly in decline.
2) Reforming how we measure success
Currently poor value is allocated to the translation components of the R&D 
spectrum, particularly in relation to patents and associated activities. The exist-
ing reward system mitigates against translation with academics recognised and 
rewarded for publications, while patents and broader industry experience are not 
valued as an equal or celebrated measure of success. 
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It is recommended that the National Health and Medical Research Council 
(NHMRC) reform to encourage translational research, without jeopardising basic 
discovery. The NHMRC manages over $780 million a year, and competition for 
project grants and fellowships is fierce. Therefore whatever criteria it places on 
awarding funding, become the goals for most medical researchers in this country. 
Because the NHMRC’s remit is about sup-
porting health and medical research, not 
health and medical commercialisation, the 
metrics of success are typically academic. 
Any time spent producing patents, working 
with industry or spinning off a biotechnol-
ogy company is time not spent publishing 
papers in top tier journals. And less publica-
tions means less money for researchers. 
As a result, indirectly, the Australian 
medical research funding system pun-
ishes those who spend the time involved in 
commercialisation. 
This doesn’t necessarily mean wholesale changes to the way the NHMRC oper-
ates, or require explicit funding of commercialisation, but a simple change in the 
metrics used to evaluate funding applications could have a substantial impact in 
encouraging researchers to take their ideas out of the lab and into the market.
3) Proving the concept
The so-called “valley of death” could be bridged by moving a discovery from the 
point where it looks good on paper to where it looks enticing to an investor. This 
is the precipitous gap between the point a discovery is made, typically as a result 
of publicly-funded research, and the point where it is attractive enough to receive 
private funding to take it down the development pathway. Currently there is little 
capital available to fund this crucial step, meaning many potential medical break-
throughs remain dormant with respect to community impact.
This can be as simple as doing one pivotal proof-of-concept experiment – the 
“killer experiment” – that will reduce the risk of investing in a discovery to the 
point where an enterprising venture capitalist or angel investor might be willing to 
invest.
The current system fails at this point. We have a nonsensical situation where we 
fund a research project right up to the point where we can find the final answers: 
Does it in fact work or not, and is it a commercially viable discovery? And at that 
point, cease support, which makes no sense from a logical, from an academic, 
or from an economic point-of-view. A small proportion of funding to finish that 
process, and provide evidence of the science and the commercial concept, would 
be money well spent.
Something as simple as a “killer experiment” fund could go a long way to rectify-
ing this situation. It could be run in a similar way to current NHMRC Development 
Grants, which are assessed centrally by peer-review. However it is managed, if 
“ We have a nonsensical situation where we fund a 
research project right up to the point where we can 
find the final answers: Does it in fact work or not, 
and is it a commercially viable discovery? And at that 
point, cease support, which makes no sense from 
a logical, from an academic, or from an economic 
point-of-view.”
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only a fraction of the dollars that are put into discovery research are contributed 
to providing proof-of-concept funding; this would enable small biotechs to better 
attract investors.
4) Expert critical mass
There are commercialisation units attached to virtually all universities and research 
institutions across the country. Their performance varies widely as many are 
understaffed and under-resourced. 
Often they have to provide services to a startling array of technologies with only 
limited expertise in those areas. The problem is often one of never reaching criti-
cal mass of people, expertise and resources.
Once critical mass is achieved, then things can be radically different, as demon-
strated by UniQuest, the commercialisation arm of the University of Queensland. 
Besides the well-known Gardasil vaccine, UniQuest has been involved in spinning 
out companies such as QRxPharma and ImpediMed. From an initial $10 million in 
funding, and using a “hub-and-spoke” model, it has delivered over $320 million in 
revenues over the past five years.
One way to help other institutions benefit from similar critical mass is to aggre-
gate commercialisation organisations into clusters, each of which service multiple 
research institutions. Such a notion was recommended by the Association of 
Australian Medical Research Institutes in its recent submission to the McKeon 
Review of Health and Medical Research in Australia.
5) Supercharging investment
Another way to more effectively transform translational research in Australia is in 
accessing the tremendous wealth contained in Australia’s superannuation funds. 
If only a tiny fraction of this money could be invested in biotechnology, it could 
give commercialisation a much needed “shot in the arm”. 
AusBiotech added its voice to the growing chorus of eminent Australians who 
believe that the governments have a role to play in encouraging the superannua-
tion industry to invest in next generation industries, which require a long term view 
of sustainability and growth.
Peter Beattie, quoted in The Australian9, said: 
“Australia’s superannuation industry has a key role to play in innovation and may offer 
part of the solution.
“In a time of relative prosperity, Australia should establish a pool of capital to invest 
in next-generation industries. Superannuation investment returns are taxed at 15 per 
cent. A fraction of a percentage of this should be invested in innovation translation 
and commercialisation, creating a knowledge-based economy and leading to jobs 
and wealth creation.”
Alan Dormer, Leader, Innovation for Services in Science at CSIRO, has argued 
publicly in The Conversation10 that superannuation funds investing in innovation 
companies could be a win: win with both short and long term benefits.
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Australia’s fast-growing superannuation funds, the world’s fourth largest pool of 
managed funds, totals $1.3 trillion at present and is expected to grow to $3 tril-
lion by 2022, with the proportion of self-managed superannuation funds set to 
increase within the total pool. 
At present, little of that money flows to innovation. This is largely because super-
annuation companies are highly constrained in terms of where they invest, and 
how much risk they’re willing to take. They also often don’t have the specialised 
expertise it takes to assess life science companies, or have the agility and oppor-
tunity to make small investments in individual 
companies. AusBiotech recommends a forum, 
which gathers key interests together, including 
the superannuation industry, the finance indus-
try, and small innovative industries to talk about 
what vehicle could be designed that will be 
acceptable to the trustees of super funds and 
to superannuants, and would benefit innovation 
in this country.
In addition to AusBiotech’s active stake in policy 
and advocacy activities, the organisation is sup-
porting the industry with a range of projects. Of note is AusBiotech’s international 
investment series and the most recent project is supporting the governance of 
boards to increase their attractiveness to investors. 
AusBiotech Investment offers a comprehensive series of national and international 
investor events as a global platform for Australian life sciences companies to 
showcase their company’s offering for partnership and investment. Biotechnology 
and mining are the only Australian industries to actively seek investment in this 
way and it has proven to be a successful formula.
At AusBiotech 2011, research and consulting firm, Insync Surveys, conducted an 
independent and confidential review11 of the Australian Summit, which has been 
held annually since 2009. 
While it’s difficult to quantify, investors were asked to estimate the value of deals 
they expect from investment discussions they initiated at ALSIS 2011, and the 
actual value of deals that were done. The results show that between $33 and $99 
million had been invested in the presenting companies as a result of the 2010 and 
2009 events. At the conclusion of the 2011 event, $228 million worth of deals 
were in discussion, suggesting the Summit would generate substantially more 
investment than previous years.
The “Board Enhancement” project, which commenced in 2012, was designed 
to support and enhance the governance of boards of directors leading life sci-
ences companies, with two documents. In addition to the best practice message 
that the project’s resulting documents will provide to investors and others, it also, 
very importantly, seeks to support and build the capability and understanding of 
less experienced directors or those new to life sciences. Providing clear guide-
lines assists the company executive by reinforcing the necessary steps that the 
company and its directors will need to consider in its responsibilities. 
“ With 2013 looming as another challenging year on 
the economic front, and uncertainty created by an 
election, the biotechnology industry pins its hopes 
on the vision and commitment of our country’s 
policy makers and their will and capability for 
nation-building leadership.”
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What is well appreciated is that innovative, technically-focussed companies in the 
life science sector have different pressures, such as mandatory regulatory con-
siderations and a different business cycle than many other industries. Therefore, 
directors of such companies do require additional knowledge, not generally learnt 
from available materials or taught in mainstream governance courses. 
In partnership with the Victorian Government, the ASX, venture capitalists and 
company CEOs and chairs, the project will have two prongs (resulting in the two 
documents):
Part 1: Update and reproduce a •	 Code of Best Practice for use by innovative life 
science companies, which is now nearing completion; and 
Part 2: Produce a practical guide for directors of public and private life sciences •	
companies.
With 2013 looming as another challenging year on the economic front, and uncer-
tainty created by an election, the biotechnology industry pins its hopes on the 
vision and commitment of our country’s policy makers and their will and capability 
for nation-building leadership. It also pins its hopes on the proven ability to attract 
overseas investment and to develop technology to a stage that represents value 
and opportunity for partners and ultimately the community. 
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This chapter examines the “valley of death” in drug 
development and healthcare and opportunities to 
bridge the gap between academia and industry and in 
turn improve Australia’s performance.
5.  Traversing the valley  
of death
 Dr Julian Clark 
H e a l t H c a r e :  r e f o r m  o r  r a t i o n
68
H e a l t H c a r e :  r e f o r m  o r  r a t i o n
69
Our challenge
Imagine an economy where rising healthcare costs present an economic burden 
rivalled only by the disease burden that they are failing to address. The US already 
invests more than 17 per cent of its GDP in healthcare; Australia is approach-
ing 10 per cent of GDP. Imagine these same economies investing significantly in 
research but failing to reap rewards through approved products and therapies 
that help reduce the burden of health. No need to imagine, this is the reality of the 
therapeutic drug and vaccine industry where, in spite of more than a doubling in 
investment since the 1990s, new drug approvals have fallen by one half to only 
about 21 drugs per year1 and the total industry cost has now reached a US$1.9 
billion investment to achieve each approved new drug.2 This sets the scene for 
the notorious “valley of death”, a wasteland of exceptionally poor productivity 
where potentially exciting research discoveries funded largely by taxpayers fall off 
the precipice on one side of the valley, fail to traverse the development terrain in 
the valley, and fail to make the onward journey to benefit patients.
The “valley of death” as a metaphor for economic failure is not restricted to drug 
development and healthcare, it is seen in many industry sectors such as engi-
neering, chemical processes, ITC and automotive. The “valley of death” can be 
seen as a “chicken and egg” conundrum where manufacturers wait until there is a 
demonstrated demand before they develop and commercialise technologies, and 
buyers wait to see the product on the market before they demonstrate that they 
will buy it.3 The challenge is so great that it is currently the subject of a House 
of Commons Public Enquiry in the UK.4 Testimony to date shows that while the 
Dr Julian Clark is Head of Business Development at the Walter and Eliza Hall 
Institute and has more than 30 years of international experience in leading 
biomedical research enterprises.  Building on senior executive experience in 
Europe, Japan, North America, India and Australia, Julian has been particularly 
active in translating business opportunities across the public-private interface.  
Julian is a Fellow of the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and 
Engineering, has a PhD (University of Glasgow), and an Honorary Doctorate (University of 
South Australia).  Julian has been a director or CEO of several biomedical companies, is 
Chairman of the CSIRO P-Health Flagship Advisory Board, and a member of the Medical 
Research Commercialisation Fund Investment Committee (Brandon Capital).
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“valley of death” appears universal to science, technology and engineering, each 
sector has its own challenges due to different responses to knowledge trans-
fer, supply chain management, networks and standardisation.5 Importantly, in 
evidence presented to the enquiry Sir John Chisholm observed that the biotech-
nology, biomedical and chemical process sectors remain highly fragmented while 
sectors based on engineering disciplines are more integrated.6 This phenomenon 
was recognised in Japan a decade ago when there was a simultaneous rise in 
research spending and decline in global competitiveness for Japan based on a 
“valley of death” discontinuity between basic research and applications in many 
sectors.7 The US Department of Energy cites the “valley of death” as being a 
major technology transfer challenge where failure to link the laboratory bench with 
the market results in “countless lost opportunities”8.
We will now focus on the biomedical sector, particularly as it relates to therapeutic 
drug development. This focus is provided from the viewpoint of the author being 
a practitioner working internationally at the academic/industry interface for more 
than 30 years and having experienced many personal expeditions across the 
“valley of death”. Critically, experience from such journeys reveals a major gap 
between the complexities of reality, and the relatively sparse academic and policy 
literature that attempts to address technology transfer across the “valley of death”. 
Despite heavy investments of time and money, only 14 per cent of new health 
related scientific discoveries are applied to day-to-day clinical practice, meaning 
a wastage of 86 per cent, and translation takes an average of 17 years from dis-
covery9 when the life of a patent is normally 20 years. This sobering reality shows 
that there is little time to reap the rewards of an exclusive commercial monopoly 
provided by a granted patent.
Consequently, Australia’s challenge is to creatively embrace, through a whole 
of sectors approach, the multiple key drivers that can reduce the impact of the 
“valley of death” through recognition of the broad challenges, and implement tar-
geted actions. 
The terrain
The “valley of death” is familiar to any researcher and entrepreneur who has 
tried to translate an invention into tangible outcomes and returns. It has been 
variously described as a technology transfer challenge10, a Darwinian process 
selecting against uncompetitive innovations11, and a challenge of supply chain 
risk management.12
Irrespective of these different perspectives, the “valley of death” is much larger 
than often portrayed. It is an economic rift valley that is wide and deep and made 
up of several valleys, each with different drivers and occurring at different stages. 
A tendency to focus on economic or policy intervention addressing only a single 
problem actually reflects the basic reductionist challenges of drug development – 
focusing on one drug for one target when biology works as a complex network of 
cross talking pathways, paralleled by our tendency to focus on a single economic 
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intervention when we are dealing with a curiously complex system. The following 
will show that the “valley of death” results from a complex system failure, and as 
such requires a systems approach to overcome.
While the “valley of death” is apparent in both the private and public sectors it is 
most marked in the public sector where we attempt to transfer high risk tolerance 
from the public account to a lower risk tolerance in the private capital investment 
sector in the absence of capital from either sector. In fact it is this mismatch of 
risk perception that creates the psycho-economic gap where a relatively small 
investment in proof of concept and intellectual property positions could lead 
to progression across the valley floor. Rather than naively thinking that venture 
capitalists will address the problem through an unlimited appetite for high risk, 
it is quite clear that investment decisions in the innovation sequence require a 
strong intellectual property position, including investment, and a proof of concept 
requirement that varies significantly between potential investors.13 Such a conclu-
sion means that, irrespective of the total public sector investment in healthcare, 
the distribution of the investment must be considered in the context of at least 
seed funds available to establish a robust intellectual property position and proof 
of concept to catalyse downstream investment.
The process and its challenges
The challenge of bringing a new drug to market spans many sequential stages 
– each one frequently a victim of the “valley of death” on the journey between 
bench research and clinical application. The journey starts with the drug target, 
which once discovered, must be validated both alone and increasingly in consort 
with other drug targets. As a consequence of the Human Genome Project and 
the rapid development of gene sequencing and expression technologies in the 
last decade, the system is almost “awash” with potential drug targets. Ironically, in 
the last decade or so this plethora of important basic but unvalidated information 
has led to the rise and success of “phenotypic drug screening” where the effect 
of a chemical compound is measured in terms of a biological outcome, such as 
stopping cell division, before the specific target has been identified14. This trend 
is particularly relevant to the context of the “valley of death” because the detailed 
understanding of the molecular mechanism of action of a drug required for proof 
of concept increasingly requires the depth of knowledge from the academic side 
of the “valley of death”.
Then translation must occur whereby molecules that bind specifically to the target 
are constructed. These are not yet drugs but start the journey of proof of concept 
that must at least have data in credible animal models before further investment 
can be attracted.15 This is the first “valley of death” because there are insignifi-
cant public funds available for proof of concept and a market that will not invest 
without proof of concept.16 Now comes the second “valley of death” where pre-
clinical development requires significant resources to optimise the candidate drug 
molecule, but in an environment where there is a decline in resources for skilled 
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clinician researchers who are vital for “design-in”, ensuring that the drug design 
concepts address a clinical need, safely and efficaciously.17 
We now have a major confounding factor – both of these valleys must be tra-
versed with a strong intellectual property position, but unfortunately this is usually 
attempted in the face of inadequate funds for patent application and prosecution, 
and critical exemplifying evidence. At the very least the inventors must ensure a 
strong provisional patent application, have the resources necessary to exemplify 
the invention within 12 months, and then have the funds necessary to prosecute 
a PCT (patent cooperation treaty) application – usually beyond the means of most 
publically funded biomedical research groups.
The third “valley of death” is in fact a series of valleys as the candidate drug pro-
gresses through clinical trials. During these stages costs escalate dramatically 
and real safety and efficacy in human patients must be demonstrated. These 
stages put our knowledge of the drug, target and disease on full display, and the 
high attrition rates are testimony to major deficiencies that must be addressed 
through improved knowledge, better processes and sharper development deci-
sions. The final “valley of death” occurs around the time of product approval. At 
this final hurdle, regulators may decide that the new drug has little benefit over 
existing options or may present unacceptable risks. Insurers may decide that 
the cost/benefit ratio is unacceptable and deny reimbursement. Once a product 
is approved then of course it will be subject to all the normal pressures of the 
market based on price, benefit, positioning, competition 
and intellectual property challenge.
Compounding the above process is the reality that trans-
lation has moved from a simple linear process into one 
that requires frequent iterations between “patient bedside 
and lab bench” similar to a practise well established in, 
for example, the aerospace industry. The drivers here are 
the increasing understanding that disease and patients 
must be stratified for effective therapy and the basis of 
this stratification is driven by molecular biomarkers – this being the genesis of 
personalised medicine. Consequently, we now require access to skilled molecular 
biologists, medicinal chemists, clinician researchers and molecular pathologists in 
a team environment never before experienced. 
The scene is set – translation of discoveries into patient benefits requires atten-
tion to resources, skills, interactions, regulations, decisions, and policy before we 
can successfully traverse the “valley of death”. Basic research requires resources 
and skills for proof of concept and an intellectual property position before being 
able to contemplate the journey to market. Patients and insurers need more cost 
effective treatments. Governments and company shareholders want greater cer-
tainty of returns from their investments.
“ …translation of discoveries into patient 
benefits requires attention to resources, 
skills, interactions, regulations, decisions, 
and policy before we can successfully 
traverse the ‘valley of death’.”
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Range of causes
The journey across the “valley of death” is intimately linked to the psychology 
and reality of risk, risk mitigation, understanding the drivers of project attrition and 
having the courage to invest on the basis of, initially at least, relatively little proof 
of concept data. By way of example, the Walter and Eliza Hall Institute recently 
embarked on a major drug discovery and development collaboration where 
industry experience would show that the initial chance of commercial success 
was only two per cent, i.e. a 98 per cent chance of failure. As a consequence 
of investment by the commercial partner, intellectual property was created, the 
project de-risked and after a successful phase one clinical trial the project now 
has a 25 per cent chance of reaching the market, based on previous experience. 
But this is still less than halfway across the “valley of death” and the Institute and 
its commercialisation partners still face a 
75 per cent chance of failure based on 
market experience.
The “valley of death” is clearly a complex 
economic and social phenomenon. 
There has always been a temptation to 
simplify analysis through reductionism 
and view the situation as being one of 
inadequate funds alone. For example, Beard et al report that the main contribu-
tor is inadequate funds “upstream” but not “downstream” and “a valley of death 
arises when there is more output at stage one than the private sector is willingly 
to fund at stage two”18 thereby expecting fewer problems if the ratio of investment 
size to sunk costs is small.
A worsening of the medical “valley of death” over the last decade is primar-
ily due to two major compounding factors – inadequate early stage investment 
and declining clinician researcher resources. The “valley of death” persists after 
nearly two decades due to inadequate discipline focus including pathology and 
physiology, pharmacokinetics, preclinical models, drug delivery and formulation, 
and clinical translation expertise – all implying serious flaws, invalid assumptions 
and inadequate knowledge before drug candidates enter the clinical translation 
stage.19 
“The growing gap between the research and clinical enterprises has resulted in fewer 
scientists with a true understanding of clinical problems as well as scientists who 
are unable to or uninterested in gleaning new basic research hypotheses from failed 
clinical trials.”20
Another contributor to the “valley of death” is the lack of training and experi-
ence required for merger and post-merger integration of organisations that is a 
natural consequence of an industry sector under stress. More than 67 per cent of 
biomedical acquisitions fail and few are adequately trained in post-merger integra-
tion21 and such mergers and acquisitions can have a negative impact right across 
the “valley of death” as organisations attempt to survive resources shortages and 
project failure. Barr et al have a different approach to addressing the “valley of 
“ A worsening of the medical ‘valley of death’ over the 
last decade is primarily due to two major compounding 
factors – inadequate early stage investment and declining 
clinician researcher resources.”
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death” and stress the importance of the teaching of entrepreneurship and inte-
grating it into the higher education curricula, having identified the contribution of 
failed teaching when it is not “real, intensive, interdisciplinary and iterative.”22
Markham et al recognise the “valley of death” as a metaphor that suggests more 
resources on one side of the valley in the form of research expertise and early IP 
and on the other side product development and commercialisation expertise and 
resources. Importantly, they emphasise role behaviour in innovation, the dynamic 
set of relationships required to turn a discovery into an innovation and a product, 
and not just static positions.23 Consequently, the “valley of death” is also due to 
cultural priority and strategic differences between academic, industry and govern-
ment players that in turn contribute to translation inefficiencies. 
“Despite their long-standing appetite for drug discovery, these sectors continue to 
advance largely as distinct constructs whose character and internal workings invite 
challenges and dissonances counter to their high-return synergism within a research-
based discovery enterprise.” 24
Other contributors to the “valley of death” relate to the importance of private 
sector price setting and the need for a return on investment, stimulating inno-
vation activity, and the need for education of consumers25 about the benefits of 
breakthrough products such as new therapeutics and vaccines. The problem of 
the difficulty of reproducing experimental results contributes to failure when tra-
versing the “valley of death” but is rarely mentioned. Flawed experimental data 
with inadequate methodological description to enable reproduction contribute to 
the challenge at a scale much greater than previously admitted.26 
High level Australian perspective
With a high public investment in research, a relatively low business investment 
in research, a small industry with few large players and risk discerning capital 
resources, it is reasonable to assume that Australia is particularly vulnerable to 
the “valley of death”. Table 1 presents indicative metrics that illustrate aspects of 
the challenge. Australia has less than one half of the OECD level of patents on 
a population basis. When considered in the context of the relatively close rela-
tionship between academia and business in the US, Europe and Japan we may 
find some cultural rather than economic answers. Could it be that Sweden and 
Switzerland have a patenting rate four – five times greater than Australia because 
there is a long history of academic engagement in transferring technology and 
engineering innovations to industry? Could their success be partly due to a long 
history of joint academic/industry appointments and mobility between the sectors, 
something that rarely happens in Australia?
Residential patent applications in Australia are one half those in Sweden and one 
quarter those in the US. Australia’s investment in research and development (R&D) 
is nearly 50 per cent below that of the OECD average, a metric exacerbated by 
Australia’s even greater relative underperformance in the level of business R&D 
as a proportion of GDP. The OECD business investment in R&D is 60 per cent 
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greater than that in Australia. Swedish company investment in R&D is nearly three 
times that of their counterparts in Australia.
Australia’s relatively high participation rate in global science publications, reflect-
ing significant public investment in basic research, is matched by a venture capital 
industry underinvesting at a level around one quarter of the OECD average. 
Australia published nearly 60 per cent more scientific articles than the OECD on a 
population basis but has venture capital investment at one quarter of the level in 
the OECD. Even before exploring details, our challenge in traversing the “valley of 
death” is evident.
With respect to innovation, Australia performs well below the OECD average, and 
most innovation is incremental with only seven per cent of SMEs and 12 per cent 
of large firms introducing new-to-the-market product innovations.29 Of approxi-
mately 6.7 million patents in force globally in 2008, only 31,000 (0.5 per cent) 
were of Australian origin, although 108,000 (1.6 per cent) of the global total had 
Australia as a destination.31 This is a major intellectual property trade imbalance 
that underpins our relative weakness in being able to traverse the “valley of death” 
and is contrary to our 4.4 per cent global share of highly cited scientific articles.30
Australia’s competitive position has just become worse because underfunding 
of universities and medical research institutes means that funds that could be 
used to capture and nurture intellectual property and establish proof of concept 
will be increasingly diverted to funding generic infrastructure charges. It is well 
established internationally that each direct dollar invested in public research 
requires a further investment of 60 cents to fund infrastructure.32 Unlike their US 
Metric Australia US Sweden Switzerland Japan OECD
Triadic patent families  
per million population 27 
18 53 80 108 117 43
Residential patent applications 
per $bn GDP 28
3.7 17.8 8.2 5.5 82.2 n/a
Gross domestic expenditure  
on R&D (per cent GDP) 29
1.8 2.6 3.7 2.9 3.4 2.8
Business expenditure on R&D 
(per cent GDP) 29
1.0 1.8 2.8 2.1 2.6 1.6
Scientific articles per million 
population 29
780 700 1,100 1,180 420 500
Venture capital investment  
(per cent GDP) 29
0.04 0.20 0.23 0.13 n/a 0.17
Health expenditure   
(per cent GDP) 30
9.2 17.2 9.3 11.5 8.2 n/a
Table 1 
inDiCAtivE mEtriCs rElEvAnt to tHE “vAllEy of DEAtH”
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counterparts for example, Australian medical research institutes have never had 
fully funded infrastructure and have typically had to divert returns on endow-
ments and bequests into maintaining 
infrastructure at the expense of direct 
innovation investment. This situation 
has now spread to Australia’s universi-
ties where the Federal Government has 
removed more than $1 billion from future 
university investment.33 Such a major 
shortfall in funding Australia’s public 
sector research will clearly result in a further erosion of our competitive position 
and increased casualties in the “valley of death”.
What are the institutional barriers in Australia?
Experience working in the “valley of death” in Australia reveals several critical 
areas where we are less competitive than our peer economies, particularly with 
respect to the journey for publically funded biomedical and health research:
Intellectual property: There are few resources for intellectual property protection, •	
inadequate awareness of the importance of strong composition of matter claims 
and early stage abandonment due to a lack of financing partners. Patenting 
is not considered to be important enough to be funded through competitive 
research grants.
Proof of concept: Basic research is relatively well funded in Australia. However, •	
the system rapidly abandons the innovator needing to provide proof of concept. 
Such an investment is essential to attract further funding both public and 
private and in its absence a journey across the “valley of death” cannot even 
commence. Together with the lack of funds for patent protection this sets the 
scene for increasing underperformance, loss of competitiveness and economic 
wastage.
Research infrastructure funding: The current reality of the highly fragmented •	
Federal/state research funding industry is that medical research institutes and 
universities have increasingly fewer discretionary funds to invest in intellectual 
property and proof of concept. We have a system where our main research 
organisations are internationally handicapped due to the need to divert funds 
into infrastructure.
Mobility and supply chain: Employment relationships, terms and sector culture •	
in Australia do little to encourage significant two way mobility and dual appoint-
ments between the public and private sectors. As a consequence there is 
a limitation to sharing of experience and skills in translation, and a tendency 
to reinforce the disconnect that can occur between basic research, product 
development and commercialisation. The human resources challenge has also 
become greater due to an increasing reliance on recruiting international early 
career researchers, often of Asian background. This sets the scene for a two 
“ Such a major shortfall in funding Australia’s public sector 
research will clearly result in a further erosion of our 
competitive position and increased casualties in the ‘valley 
of death’.”
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fold human resource challenge – firstly a supply chain issue to address a pipeline 
of people to train in science, technology and successfully traverse the “valley of 
death”, and secondly a cross-cultural experience and communication issue.
Clinical translation resources: Translation of biomedical discoveries requires •	
close engagement with the public hospital and health system. It is precisely this 
system that has suffered from years of declining investment in the translational 
research agenda in Australia’s public hospitals. As a consequence there are 
insufficient experienced clinician researchers to help us navigate the “valley of 
death”.
Benchmark initiatives
To date there have been no holistic initiatives that recognise the system’s 
challenges presented by the “valley of death”. However, recently the US has 
broadened its approach through two actions, albeit both in their infancy. The 
Cures Acceleration Network (CAN) has been established to address the chasm 
between basic scientific discoveries and treatments and specifically the issue of 
the early drug target validation stage in the “valley of death”.34 
Under this scheme it is proposed that the government funds grants and con-
tracts up to $15 million per year to companies, academics and patients to help 
bridge the “valley of death” as it relates to early translational challenges.35 CAN 
is authorised to spend $500 million per year through partnership awards that 
require matching funds at the rate of one non-federal dollar per three dollars of 
NIH award, and smaller grants that have no requirement for matching funds.36 
The Clinical Translational Science Awards (CTSA) initiative also funded by the US 
National Institutes of Health in many ways complements the CAN program by 
focussing on skills development. 
Major goals are:
To solve complex problems by supplying cost effective research support such •	
as bioinformatics; 
To encourage career development of investigators interested in translational •	
research; 
To work collaboratively so as to improve and reengineer the clinical research •	
enterprise; and 
To maximise results by partnering with for-profit and non-profit institutions in •	
order to advance medical discoveries.37
Thirdly, such is the power of the concept that the “valley of death” is the cause of 
the stalling of the pharmaceutical industry pipeline, that it has recently led to the 
structural reconfiguration of the NIH to create the National Centre for Advancing 
Translational Sciences (NCATS) which was authorised by US congress in 
December 2011 with a 2012 budget of US$574 million.38
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To date there have been some significant initiatives in Australia that have made a 
positive contribution to reducing wastage and attrition across the “valley of death”. 
An example is the creation of the Medical Research Commercialisation Fund 
(MRCF) managed through Brandon Capital. The MRCF is driven by an academic 
membership model and invests at an earlier stage in biomedical research than any 
other current source of capital in Australia. While 
the MRCF does not have the scale to address 
the nation’s “valley of death” it has to date been 
a very successful vehicle, investor and developer 
of commercial translation skills.
In parallel, Australia has a pioneering example 
of an academic/business consortium specifi-
cally created to bridge the “valley of death” for 
the development of new cancer treatments – the 
Cancer Therapeutics Cooperative Research 
Centre.39 This organisation has established 
global best practice in integrating disciplines, both basic and clinical, to maximise 
the chance of a successful journey across the “valley of death”.
The recent investment by the Victorian Government in the Molecules to Medicines 
business development intern scheme sets the scene for a potential national initia-
tive that focuses on developing researcher’s skills and capacity to navigate the 
“valley of death”. This scheme is based on four year’s experience at the Walter and 
Eliza Hall Institute in experiential training and mentoring of early career researchers 
in translation. In parallel the Institute has also successfully experimented with an 
internal early stage fund to establish proof of concept. This Catalyst Fund has to 
date returned more than three times the investment and has demonstrated that 
decisions to invest in proof of concept are best made when the decision is close 
to source. As a consequence several opportunities have been accelerated across 
the “valley of death”.
Opportunities and actions
In spite of Australia’s relatively weak skills and resources for traversing the “valley 
of death” there exist some important opportunities to improve performance.
Firstly, the “valley of death” should be specifically addressed as it relates to health 
and medical research in the McKeon Strategic Review of Health and Medical 
Research in Australia. An interim consultation paper from this review sets the 
scene with a recommendation for a more targeted distribution of funds to the 
translational arena40 where clearly securing an intellectual property position and 
proof of concept are critical to a return on public and private investment.
Secondly, a significant opportunity exists for public/private partnerships being 
initiated by a relatively small university and medical research organisation invest-
ing in upstream activities that establish proof of concept and the beginnings of a 
“ This Catalyst Fund has to date returned more than 
three times the investment and has demonstrated 
that decisions to invest in proof of concept are best 
made when the decision is close to source.  As 
a consequence several opportunities have been 
accelerated across the ‘valley of death’.”
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strong intellectual property position. The declining number of venture capital deals 
over the last three years and the ongoing global financial realignment has encour-
aged upstream academic organisations to invest in critical proof of concept and 
intellectual property securing activities.41,42 Is this the beginning of a change in 
academic behaviour that could co-invest with government through decentralised 
“biomedical precinct” investment funds?
Thirdly, by addressing the issue of infrastructure funding for medical and health 
research Australia can become genuinely competitive in the quest to translate 
basic research findings into meaningful and effective clinical interventions. This 
action to support infrastructure funding must also be in the context of changes 
to the peer review process, greater funding for translational research, signifi-
cantly more resources for training and early career support of potential clinician 
scientists.43 
In this process we can build on the successful experience of the MRCF, expansion 
of the Molecules to Medicines intern training program, proof of concept invest-
ment schemes and a strengthening of the clinical research precinct strategy that 
is emerging across the nation. Each of these activities will help reduce cultural dif-
ferences between academia and industry44 and make academic researchers and 
their partners better equipped for translational research and the journey across 
the “valley of death”. Downstream our efforts must focus on reducing fragmenta-
tion and overlapping regulatory reviews as well as harmonising and simplifying 
safety and licensing regulations.45 Government intervention must be conditional 
on a multifaceted program to address the issues specifically of securing intellec-
tual property and proof of concept and a belief that such intervention at an early 
stage is vital.46 Intelligent government support at the beginning of the journey into 
the “valley of death” would greatly catalyse the prospects of success, clinical 
benefit and community return.
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This chapter examines the importance of science, 
technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) 
skills and how to address the potential shortfall of 
these skills in Australia.
6.  Why STEM skills are  
important for innovation 
 Professor Ian Chubb AC 
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Why STEM skills are important for innovation
Science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) education is well 
placed to teach skills that are relevant in the information-rich modern economy, 
such as problem solving and evidence-based thinking. The creative and analytical 
talents of STEM graduates can be harnessed in business and other sectors, as 
well as academic research.
Australian STEM graduates in a wide range of careers report finding their STEM 
knowledge and skills helpful in their work, as well as in their personal lives. Earlier 
this year saw the release of A Background in Science: What science means for 
Australian society by Dr Kerri-Lee Harris, a report that had been commissioned 
by the Australian Council of Deans of Science.
Dr Harris asked 805 science graduates in what ways their science degree was 
useful. One in four respondents were working in scientific or medical research, 
and 12 per cent worked in scientific or engineering industries.1 
professor ian william Chubb, AC, MSc, DPhil (Oxford), Hon DSc (Flinders), 
Hon DLitt (CDU), Hon DUniv (ANU), Hon LL.D (Monash) is currently Australia’s 
Chief Scientist and has held the position since 23 May, 2011. 
His previous roles have included:
• 2001–2011 Vice-Chancellor, The Australian National University
• 1995–2000 Vice-Chancellor, Flinders University of South Australia
• 1993–1995 Senior Deputy Vice-Chancellor, Monash University
• 1990–1995 Chair of the Commonwealth’s Higher Education Council
• 1986–1990 Deputy Vice-Chancellor, University of Wollongong.
Professor Chubb’s research has focussed on the neurosciences and he has co-authored 
some 70 full papers and co-edited one book. 
Professor Chubb was appointed a Companion of the Order of Australia for “service to higher 
education including research and development policy in the pursuit of advancing the 
national interest socially, economically, culturally and environmentally and to the facilitation 
of a knowledge-based global economy” in 2006. He was made the ACT’s Australian of the 
Year in 2011 for his contribution to higher education.
H e a l t H c a r e :  r e f o r m  o r  r a t i o n
82
H e a l t H c a r e :  r e f o r m  o r  r a t i o n
83
But the rest had found jobs across sectors including law, government, health, 
education, food, agriculture, mining and construction. Regardless of where they 
were working, 97 per cent of all respondents said their science knowledge or 
skills were useful in their work.
My office followed up by mapping employer attitudes to STEM graduates for the 
fourth of its Occasional Paper series – STEM Education and the Workplace.2 It 
cited a study done for the UK’s Department of Business, Innovation and Skills 
(BIS) which showed a diverse range of employers seeking to attract STEM gradu-
ates, citing numeracy, analysis, and problem solving as key skills of value.3 
It is likely we will see more employer demand for STEM skills, especially as 
technology transforms developed economies. From manufacturing and retail to 
law and banking, STEM graduates will continue to be in demand in a range of 
sectors.
If Australia is to remain an innovative nation, we must build more bridges and 
better ones between employers and universities. We need to improve on the 
statistic that I think best illustrates how Australia’s science and industry sectors 
tend to reside in silos – just four per cent of our doctorate holders work in 
manufacturing.4 
So what needs to be done, to ensure we get the 
best and brightest into the right job at the right time? 
Universities need to ensure their degree programs are 
more responsive to the broad range of occupations 
that STEM graduates might enter, not just academic 
research positions. That means adjusting their cur-
riculum settings, for one.
The former Australian Learning and Teaching Council 
recommended that universities map their science 
curricula against a set of “threshold learning outcomes” which include many of 
the skills valued by employers.5 
The Australian Government’s Research Workforce Strategy argued for the devel-
opment of both “soft” or generic skills and innovation capabilities in university 
research training programs, which could then support students’ productivity in a 
wide range of jobs.6 
Similarly, in the US, an advisory committee to the National Institutes of Health has 
recommended a shift away from degree programs “aimed almost exclusively at 
preparing people for academic research positions”, to include diverse training in 
entrepreneurship, project management, and research translation.7 
Business-relevant STEM degree programs, such as the Professional Science 
Masters taught at some US institutions, provide examples of such a transition. It 
is important that Australian students interested in pursuing STEM degrees are not 
deterred by a false perception that their only option is a research career. 
There are avenues at all stages of the student cycle to signal the possibilities that 
STEM capabilities unlock. As part of recruitment efforts for prospective students, 
“ It is likely we will see more employer demand 
for STEM skills, especially as technology 
transforms developed economies. From 
manufacturing and retail to law and banking, 
STEM graduates will continue to be in demand 
in a range of sectors.”
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and career services for current students, universities can highlight the applicability 
of STEM skills to a wide range of professions and sectors.
The UK House of Lords committee recommends that universities and employers 
collaborate to expose more students to the workplace through internships and 
other means.8 In Australia, for example, the Cooperative Research Centres (CRC) 
program can provide an environment to foster industry-relevant skills.
Universities and employers need to engage with each other and reach consensus 
about what those skills should be and how to best deliver them.
Australia needs them to succeed in this endeavour, if we are to remain an innova-
tive nation. 
How to address potential STEM skill shortages
The Health of Australian Science report prepared by my office warned that 
enrolments in many Australian STEM university courses are flat or declining. But 
it might all be taking hold earlier, in our schools, as suggested by our report – 
Mathematics, Engineering and Science in the National Interest.
It used a survey completed for us by the Australian Academy of Science, which 
revealed Year 11 and 12 students have a fairly low understanding of how valu-
able science is.9 Of those actually studying science, just 33 per cent thought 
science was “almost always” relevant to their future although 47 per cent thought 
it “almost always” relevant to Australia’s future.
Only 19 per cent thought it “almost always” useful in everyday life. When those 
students not studying science (roughly one-third of the cohort) were surveyed it 
got worse. Just one per cent thought it relevant to their future “almost always” 
and 42 per cent thought never. Four per cent thought it “almost always” useful in 
everyday life, 42 per cent thought sometimes and 18 per cent thought never. 
Given this attitude, it was not surprising that Mathematics, Engineering and 
Science in the National Interest revealed that the proportion of enrolments in 
mathematics and science in Year 12 has decreased over the years and that it 
continues to fall slowly.
Nationally, 51 per cent of students take a science subject or subjects (including 
psychology) which amounted to 110,328 students in 2010.10 Between 1992 (after 
which school retention rates were fairly stable) and 2009, the proportion of Year 
12 students taking physics, chemistry and biology fell by 31 per cent, 23 per cent 
and 32 per cent respectively.11` 
While 72 per cent of the Year 12 cohort in 2010, it was important to note the shift 
from advanced to intermediate or elementary mathematics.
The consultation we undertook to try to understand the reasons behind the 
decrease, allowed us to hear some important messages. One was that, like 
everywhere else it has been studied, inspirational teaching is seen as the key 
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– both to the quality of our science education system, but just as importantly to 
raising student interest to higher levels.
Inspiring teachers will generally be those who are confident that they know their 
subject well, and can transmit that confidence, and their passion, into the class-
room. We have many teachers like that, but we need more. We require coherent 
in-service support for teachers, and quality pre-service education.
It is time to re-think how we prepare our teachers and how we support them: 
Support to strengthen their content knowledge, to maintain it at contemporary 
levels and to instil the confidence to deliver the curriculum in interesting and novel 
ways.
The other key message was that the way we teach science, especially the tech-
niques we use, needs to change. That does not mean dumbing it down, but it is 
important to note that many students said they found the way science was being 
taught to them was too didactic, even boring. 
They thought that the scientific facts 
were not related to what they saw 
around them, and practical classes were 
largely about recipes or watching teach-
ers following recipes, with little time for 
reflection.
It was a theme we followed up on in the 
Health of Australian Science Report which cited a survey of students on how to 
improve science classes.
The most common suggestion they provided for improving science classes was to 
make those classes more interactive by including more investigations, excursions, 
practical lessons or class discussions. Thirty per cent of students suggested this.
During our consultations (for the Mathematics, Engineering and Science in the 
National Interest report), teachers themselves acknowledged the issues and 
thought that health and safety guidelines restricted their ability to offer interesting 
practicals, and the lack of technical support meant that too much of the prepara-
tion was left to teachers with too little time.
The importance of technical support for science teachers was emphasised 
time and again. The issue is that science is not taught as it is actually practised: 
hypothesis, experimentation, observation, interpretation and debate. And inter-
esting ways of getting the facts into context are not used often enough.
There are novel ways of enhancing support for teachers and bringing practitioners 
into the classroom and the best of these draw on the expertise and enthusiasm of 
the mathematics, engineering and science community – the active practitioners. 
For example, school principals and teachers spoke positively about some inno-
vative pilot programs to bring mathematicians, scientists and engineers into 
schools involving the Australian Academy of Science, the Australian Academy of 
Technological Services and CSIRO.
“ Universities and employers need to engage with each other 
and reach consensus about what those skills should be and 
how to best deliver them. Australia needs them to succeed 
in this endeavour, if we are to remain an innovative nation.”
H e a l t H c a r e :  r e f o r m  o r  r a t i o n
86
H e a l t H c a r e :  r e f o r m  o r  r a t i o n
87
There were also some helpful ideas in a submission from the Australian Council of 
Deans of Science.
The ACDS explained two notable reasons for teachers favoring dry theory over 
laboratory activities. One was the enactment of much more stringent occupa-
tional health and safety requirements, which many teachers lack the expertise 
and resources to meet. The other was teachers’ lack of laboratory experience, 
which might result in them finding it hard to produce educationally sound activi-
ties and to adapt creatively to limited resources.
The ACDS suggested extending the ASELL project (Advancing Science Education 
by Learning in the Laboratory) to include not just tertiary science teachers, but 
those teaching Year 7–10 science as 
well. The first ASELL Schools Workshop 
was conducted just two months after the 
publication of our report.
Three experiments were submitted 
for evaluation at that first workshop in 
Sydney, so I think it is fair to say we have 
some way to go in establishing ASELL in 
schools on a larger scale.
But it is a start, as is the Australian cur-
riculum for secondary schools including 
the strands Science as a human endeavour and Science inquiry skills12 and hope-
fully more students will experience the joy of scientific discovery through fieldwork 
and laboratory experiments.
This year’s Federal Budget allocated $54 million to begin to address issues related 
to training teachers and inspiring students to a greater interest in science and 
mathematics.13 
In order to drive inspirational and high quality teaching in high school maths and 
science, this commitment included: 
$10.9 million to improve the quality of teacher training through innovative deliv-•	
ery of maths and science teaching programs for prospective teachers.
$3 million for national support and advice for teachers, including funding for a •	
national advisory and linking service, online videos to illustrate new teaching 
standards, practical activities for school science laboratories and to provide 
advice for school science laboratory technicians and science teachers on safe 
practices.
$5 million for the Science Connections program to equip teachers with the •	
ability and confidence to deliver inquiry-based science education and to provide 
a suite of high quality curriculum resources linked to the Australian Curriculum 
for Science (Foundation to Year 10) which I just mentioned.
These and other measures are all important steps to ensuring Australia has 
enough STEM-skilled workers to meet the job demands of the future.
“ Today, Australian biomedical research shares the tale of 
two cities: it is the best of times, and the worst. In some 
ways, the field is experiencing a golden age: the amount 
of basic research being conducted and budgets are far 
larger than they were in the 1980s or 90s…paradoxically, 
research advances (in quality and quantity) have not led to 
a marked increase in new cures.”
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The picture for biomedicine
When it comes to biomedical research, Australia has two main priorities.
The first is to ensure that Australia continues to contribute to the world’s stock of 
knowledge through basic research. Australian expenditure on medical research 
is estimated to be 1.1 per cent of the global expenditure but the proportion of 
world health returns attributable to Australian research is three per cent.14 As a 
developed and rich country in a rapidly changing world, we have a responsibility 
to continue to strive to be a world leader in research. Australia spent $2.8 billion 
on health R&D in 2004–05 (0.38 per cent of gross domestic product – GDP) 
ranking in the middle of comparable countries in the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). New Zealand (NZ), The Czech Republic 
and Japan spend less relative to GDP while the United Kingdom (UK), United 
States (US), Germany, France, Denmark and Canada spend more, of the 10 
countries studied.15 It is important that we contribute the knowledge and our skills 
to the world’s stock. We need to be an anticipator and not just an adaptor. 
The second priority is to improve the lot of the Australian people. Every time a 
researcher receives funding for a study into a certain gene, or a protein, there is 
an underlying hope that it will matter in a big way. That it will change the way we 
treat patients. That it will improve the health of our citizens. It is not necessarily 
about making money and filing patents, although they help, but most taxpayers 
want to see results that will help them and their loved ones.
Today, Australian biomedical research shares the tale of two cities: it is the best 
of times, and the worst. In some ways, the field is experiencing a golden age: the 
amount of basic research being conducted and budgets are far larger than they 
were in the 1980s or 90s.
Professor Julio Licinio MD is the editor of Molecular Psychiatry, the highest-rank-
ing journal in its field. He receives over 1000 papers per year, but can only publish 
three per cent of submissions. According to him, the avalanche of outstanding 
research is overwhelming. I quote: “The amount of fundamental discovery is stag-
gering and medical journals are choked with quality science.”16
That being the case, why is this the worst of times? Because, paradoxically, 
research advances (in quality and quantity) have not led to a marked increase in 
new cures. Much of what we now use to treat many common ailments is based 
on research from years ago.
In order to address both these priorities, we must ensure that we have a work-
force that is capable of contributing to both basic research, as well as the ability 
to use that research to develop innovative solutions. 
I mentioned earlier, declines in science, maths and engineering in universities. 
However, enrolments in health disciplines have been almost immune to these 
declines. In health, which includes medicine, dentistry, pharmacy and nursing, 
enrolments actually increased by more than 70 per cent between 2002 and 2010. 
Importantly, almost equal numbers of both men and women enrol in these areas 
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– a stark contrast to the discrepancies found in engineering, where less than 20 
per cent of undergraduate students are female.17 
However, it is estimated that by 2019, almost 6500 members of the health and 
medical research workforce will have retired, 4000 of whom have PhDs.18 We 
currently have sufficient rates of medical research PhD completions to maintain 
our current workforce over the next 10 years19. But if Australia is to have the most 
highly educated, best skilled and highly trained health and medical research sector 
in the world, which must be our aim, the number of PhD qualified researchers 
would need to expand 2.5 fold to be on par with the European workforce.20 
In order to achieve this, or at least help to move it along, we need to look at how 
we support medical research and the jobs in medical research. Let me ask: Does 
our present system of scholarships, numerous post-docs, grants, grants and 
more grants lead to jobs that are satisfying and secure? The answer from a fair 
number of people would be no. Therefore, we need to rethink how we support 
our best and brightest – at all ages and at all stages. Because we care – and 
because we need them.
In order to achieve this, or at least help it along, we need to look at how we support 
medical research and the jobs in medical research. From 2000–10, funding from 
the NHMRC quadrupled in size. However, funding is now on a plateau with no 
expected increases on the horizon.21 
At the same time though, the size of grants has 
been increasing and is set to continue to increase. 
As a result of greater collaborations, more expen-
sive equipment and more staff, the average size 
grant today is valued at $550,000 over three 
years. In 2000 the average grant size was around 
$260,000.22 But we have seen a huge increase in 
the number of applications. They have grown from 
around 1500 in 2000 to 3226 in 2010. In 2000 the success rate was around 30 
per cent; today it is about 23 per cent.23 
It would be easy to blame the falling success rate on falling quality, but this is not 
the case. The number of grant applications that received scores high enough to 
be “worthy of funding” but do not receive funding has been steadily increasing. In 
year 2000 it was 37 per cent of applications; in 2009, it was 58 per cent.24 
So we have the number of applications rising, the quality of applications improv-
ing, funding which has flat lined and grants that are getting bigger. A tough 
combination. And then there is the need to replace or grow the medical research 
workforce, the place of young people: the researchers we will need to carry the 
torch when some of the present flame carriers decide to do something else.
This needs to begin in our primary and high schools, and extend into our univer-
sity enrolments. I have outlined above, some means for improving the number of 
students taking STEM subjects, and the importance of doing so. These are not 
gradual changes to be made. Australia needs a step change and this will not be 
easy. 
“The number of grant applications that received 
scores high enough to be ‘worthy of funding’ 
but do not receive funding has been steadily 
increasing. In year 2000 it was 37 per cent of 
applications; in 2009, it was 58 per cent.”
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We need to change the number of students excited about science. We need to 
change the number pursuing science at school and then at university. We need to 
change the trajectory and skill base of and increase the science-trained numbers 
in the Australian workforce. And that last point means that we need to ensure 
that we can tell highly talented young people that there are careers in science – 
careers that will mean that they won’t have to wait too long (a time that appears 
to be forever to some of them) to get their house or start their family.
Change is a part of our lives – some changes we can control and some we can’t. 
Thinking about the future workforce and how we encourage people to see it as a 
fantastic career, in the numbers we need, is a challenge we can’t ignore – and a 
change over which we can exert some control.
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